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11 Introduction
This lecture commemorates the 100th anniversary of the birth of Sir John Hicks. In most
of his work, Hicks relied on the Marshallian ction of a representative agent and abstracted
from heterogeneity and variability among people and rms. Economic theory now recognizes
the importance of accounting for heterogeneity among agents in explaining a variety of phe-
nomena. See the survey in Browning et al. (1999). A major discovery of microeconometrics is
that diversity among agents is a central feature of economic life (see Heckman, 2001). While
Hicks generally ignored heterogeneity, he did discuss uncertainty. The distinction between
ex ante and ex post income played a central role in his analysis of economic dynamics (see
Hicks, 1946, p.178). It is featured in our analysis.
This paper develops and implements a method for estimating the importance of uncer-
tainty about lifetime earnings facing agents at the stage of their life cycles when they make
their college-going decisions. We estimate what components of measured lifetime income
variability among persons are due to uncertainty realized after that stage and discuss what
assumptions must be maintained to identify the distributions of these components. In accom-
plishing this task, we distinguish unobservables from the point of view of the econometrician
from unobservables from the point of view of the agents being studied. We distinguish
components of outcome variability that are forecastable and acted on at a given stage of
the life cycle from unpredictable components. If agents act on (make choices based on)
all forecastable information, under the conditions specied in this paper, we can estimate
components of intrinsic uncertainty and distinguish them from components of forecastable
uncertainty. Using the tools presented here, analysts can determine how much of lifetime
2earnings variability or inequality is forecastable at a given age and how much is unfore-
castable `luck.' With concavity in utility and lack of full insurance, at the same level of mean
income, the greater the fraction of variability in lifetime incomes that is unforecastable, the
lower the welfare of agents. Like Hicks, we distinguish ex ante returns from ex post returns.
We build on, and extend, methods developed in Carneiro et al. (2003) who separate
earnings heterogeneity (dened here as information about future earnings known to agents
and acted on in their choices) from unforecastable (at the date choices are made) uncertainty.
They assume an environment of complete autarky. In this paper, we consider a complete
markets environment. A companion paper, Cunha et al. (2004), considers an environment
with partial insurance of the type analyzed by Aiyagari (1994) and Laitner (1992).
A major theoretical issue discussed in this paper is the diculty in separately identifying
the market structure facing an agent from the agent's information set. We develop methods
for distinguishing components of future outcomes that are both forecastable and are acted on
from those components that cannot be acted on. What can be acted on and the magnitude
of the eects of the actions depends upon the market structure facing agents and their
preferences.
A major empirical nding reported in all three of our papers is that across a variety
of market environments and for dierent assumptions about and estimates of risk aversion,
a substantial part of the variability in the ex post returns to schooling is predictable and
acted on by agents. Variability cannot be equated with uncertainty and this has important
empirical consequences.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 states the problem of dis-
tinguishing between predictable earnings heterogeneity and unpredictable uncertainty for a
3specied market environment and presents the empirical strategy used in this paper. Section
3 motivates the econometric method we use. This part of the paper is an intuitive summary
of the methods formally developed in Carneiro et al. (2003) and our extensions of it. Section
4 discusses the fundamental problem of separating preferences from market structures and
information. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis and simulations of the model and
discusses the implications of the ndings. Section 6 concludes. Two appendices describe our
approach to identication and how we pool data sets to create synthetic life cycles. A third
appendix posted at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Hicks2004/ describes our data.
2 Distinguishing between heterogeneity and uncertainty
In the literature on earnings dynamics (e.g., Lillard and Willis, 1978), it is common to
estimate an earnings equation of the sort
Yi;t = Xi;t + Si + vi;t; (1)
where Yi;t;Xi;t;Si;vi;t denote (for person i at time t), the realized earnings, observable char-
acteristics, educational attainment, and unobservable characteristics, respectively, from the
point of view of the observing economist. We use bold characters to denote vectors and
distinguish them from scalars. The variables generating outcomes realized at time t may or
may not have been known to the agents at the time they made their schooling decisions.
Often the error term vi;t is decomposed into two or more components. For example, it is
4common to specify that
vi;t = i + "i;t: (2)
The term i is a person-specic eect. The error term "i;t is generally assumed to follow
an ARMA (p;q) process (see, e.g., MaCurdy, 1982) such as "i;t = "i;t 1 + mi;t, where
mi;t is a mean zero innovation independent of Xi;t and the other error components. The
components Xi;t;i; and "i;t all contribute to measured ex post variability across persons.
However, the literature is silent about the dierence between heterogeneity and uncertainty,
the unforecastable part of earnings as measured from a given age|what Jencks et al. (1972)
call `luck.'
An alternative specication of the error process postulates a factor structure for earnings,
i;t = it + i;t; (3)
where i is a vector of skills (e.g., ability, initial human capital, motivation, and the like), t
is a vector of skill prices, and the i;t are mutually independent mean zero shocks independent
of i. See Hause (1978) and Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) for analysis of such a model.
Any process in the form of equation (2) can be written in terms of (3). The latter specication
is more directly interpretable as a pricing equation than (2) and is a natural starting point
for human capital analyses. It is the one used in this paper.
Depending on the available market arrangements for coping with risk, the predictable
components of vi;t will have a dierent eect on choices and economic welfare than the un-
5predictable components, if people are risk averse and cannot fully insure against uncertainty.
Statistical decompositions based on (1), (2), and (3) or versions of them describe ex post
variability but tell us nothing about which components of (1) or (3) are forecastable by
agents ex ante. Is i unknown to the agent? "i;t? Or i + "i;t? Or mi;t? In representation
(3), the entire vector i, components of the i, the i;t, or all of these may or may not be
known to the agent at the time schooling choices are made.
The methodology presented in this paper provides a framework within which it is possible
to identify components of life cycle outcomes that are forecastable and acted on at the
time decisions are taken from ones that are not. The essential idea of the method can be
illustrated in the case of educational choice, the problem we study in our empirical work.
In order to choose between high school and college, say at age 19, agents forecast future
earnings (and other returns and costs) for each schooling level. Using information about
educational choices at age 19, together with the ex post realization of earnings and costs
that are observed at later ages, it is possible to estimate and test which components of
future earnings and costs are forecast by the agent at age 19. This can be done provided
we know, or can estimate, the earnings of agents under both schooling choices and provided
we specify the market environment under which they operate as well as their preferences
over outcomes. For certain market environments where separation theorems are valid, so
that consumption decisions are made independently of the wealth maximizing decision, it
is not necessary to know agent preferences to decompose realized earnings outcomes in this
fashion. Our method uses choice information to extract ex ante or forecast components
of earnings and to distinguish them from realized earnings. The dierence between forecast
and realized earnings allows us to identify the distributions of the components of uncertainty
6facing agents at the time they make their schooling decisions.
To be more precise, consider a version of the generalized Roy (1951) economy with two
sectors.1 Let Si denote dierent schooling levels. Si = 0 denotes choice of the high school
sector for person i, and Si = 1 denotes choice of the college sector. Each person chooses
to be in one or the other sector but cannot be in both. Let the two potential outcomes
be represented by the pair (Y0;i;Y1;i), only one of which is observed by the analyst for any
agent. Denote by Ci the direct cost of choosing sector 1, which is associated with choosing
the college sector (e.g., tuition and non-pecuniary costs of attending college expressed in
monetary values).
Y1;i is the ex post present value of earnings in the college sector, discounted over horizon














where r is the one-period risk-free interest rate. Y1;i and Y0;i can be constructed from time
series of ex post potential earnings streams in the two states: (Y0;i;0;::: ;Y0;i;T) for high
school and (Y1;i;0;::: ;Y1;i;T) for college. A practical problem is that we only observe one or
1See Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) for discussions of the generalized Roy model. In
this paper we assume only two schooling levels for expositional simplicity, although our methods apply more
generally.
7the other of these streams. This partial observability creates a fundamental identication
problem which we address in this paper.
The variables Y1;i;Y0;i; and Ci are ex post realizations of returns and costs, respectively.
At the time agents make their schooling choices, these may be only partially known to the
agent, if at all. Let Ii;0 denote the information set of agent i at the time the schooling choice
is made, which is time period t = 0 in our notation. Under a complete markets assumption
with all risks diversiable (so that there is risk neutral pricing) or under a perfect foresight
model with unrestricted borrowing or lending but full repayment, the decision rule governing





1; if E (Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci j Ii;0)  0
0; otherwise.2
(4)
Under perfect foresight, the postulated information set would include Y1;i;Y0;i; and Ci: In
either model of information, the decision rule is simple: one attends school if the expected
gains from schooling are greater than or equal to the expected costs. Under either set
of assumptions, a separation theorem governs choices. Agents maximize expected wealth
independently of how they consume it.
The decision rule is more complicated in the absence of full risk diversiability and de-
pends on the curvature of utility functions, the availability of markets to spread risk, and
possibilities for storage. (See Cunha et al., 2004, and Navarro, 2004, for a more extensive
discussion.) In more realistic economic settings, the components of earnings and costs re-
quired to forecast the gain to schooling depend on higher moments than the mean. In this
2If there are aggregate sources of risk, full insurance would require a linear utility function.
8paper we use a model with a simple market setting to motivate the identication analysis of
a more general environment we analyze elsewhere (and is analyzed in Carneiro et al., 2003).
Suppose that we seek to determine Ii;0: This is a dicult task. Typically we can only
partially identify Ii;0 and generate a list of candidate variables that belong in the information
set. We can usually only estimate the distributions of the unobservables in Ii;0 (from the
standpoint of the econometrician) and not individual person-specic information sets. To x
ideas, we start the analysis discussing identication of Ii;0 for each person but in our empirical
work we only partially identify person-specic Ii;0 and instead identify the distributions of
the remaining unobserved components.
To motivate the objectives of our analysis we oer the following heuristic discussion. We
seek to decompose the `returns coecient' in an earnings-schooling model into components
that are known at the time schooling choices are made and the components that are not
known. For simplicity we assume that, for person i, returns are the same at all levels of
schooling. Write discounted lifetime earnings of person i as
Yi = 0 + 1;iSi + Ji; (5)
where 1;i is the person-specic ex post return, Si is years of schooling, and Ji is a mean zero
unobservable. We seek to decompose 1;i into two components 1;i = i + i, where i is
a component known to the agent when he/she makes schooling decisions and i is revealed
after the choice is made. Schooling choices are assumed to depend on what is known to the
agent at the time decisions are made, Si = (i;Zi;i), where the Zi are other observed
determinants of schooling and i represents additional factors unobserved by the analyst
9but known to the agent. We seek to determine what components of ex post school lifetime
earnings Yi enter the schooling choice equation.
If i is known, it enters : Otherwise it does not. Component i and any measurement
errors in Y1;i or Y0;i should not be determinants of schooling choices. Neither should future
skill prices that are unknown at the time agents make their decisions. If agents do not use i
in making their schooling choices, even if they know it, i would not enter the schooling choice
equation. Determining the correlation between realized Yi and schooling choices based on
ex ante forecasts enables us to identify components known to agents making their schooling
decisions. Even if we cannot identify 1;i, i, or i for each person, under conditions specied
in this paper we can identify their distributions.
Suppose that the model for schooling can be written in linear in parameters form:
Si = 0 + 1i + 2i + 3Zi + i; (6)
where i has mean zero and is independent of Zi: Zi is assumed to be independent of i
and i. The Zi and the i proxy costs and may also be correlated with Ji in (5).3 In this
framework, the goal of the analysis is to determine if 2 = 0, i.e., to determine if agents pick
schooling based on ex post shocks to returns and, if they do, the relative magnitude of the
variance of i to that of i:
Application of Zi as an instrument for Si in outcome equation (5) does not enable us to
decompose 1;i into forecastable and unforecastable components. Only if agents do not use
i in making their schooling decisions does the instrumental variable (IV) method recover
3Card (2001) presents a model that can be written in this form.
10the population mean of 1;i. In that case, standard random coecient models can identify
the variance of (i + i) which is assumed to be independent of Si.4
Notice that even under the most favorable conditions for applications of the IV method,
we are only able to recover the ex post mean and total ex post variability of 1;i = i + i:
We cannot, however, decompose V ar(i + i) into its components. That is, we are not able
to assign the proportion of the variance in the return that is due to i and that due to i.
Since we cannot identify how much of the ex post return to schooling is unknown to the
agent at the time he makes his decision, we cannot solve the stated problem using just the
instrumental variable method.
Our procedure is not based on the method of instrumental variables. Rather, it exploits
certain covariances that arise under dierent information structures. To see how the method
works, simplify the model down to two schooling levels. Suppose, contrary to what is possible,
that the analyst observes Y0;i, Y1;i, and Ci. Such information would come from an ideal data
set in which we could observe two dierent lifetime earnings streams for the same person
in high school and in college as well as the costs they pay for attending college. From such
information we could construct Y1;i Y0;i Ci. If we knew the information set Ii;0 of the agent,
we could also construct E (Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci j Ii;0). Under the correct model of expectations,
we could form the residual
VIi;0 = (Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci)   E (Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci j Ii;0);
4One can use the residuals from Yi   b 0   b 1Si = b Ui to decompose the variance components, where
instrumental variables are used to generate the coecient estimates.
11and from the ex ante college choice decision, we could determine whether Si depends on
VIi;0: It should not if we have specied Ii;0 correctly. In terms of the model of equations (5)
and (6), if there are no direct costs of schooling, E (Y1;i   Y0;i j Ii;0) = i, and VIi;0 = i.
A test for correct specication of candidate information set e Ii;0 is a test of whether Si
depends on Ve Ii;0, where Ve Ii;0 = (Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci) E

Y1;i   Y0;i   Ci j e Ii;0

. More precisely,
the information set is valid if Si ? ? Ve Ii;0 j e Ii;0, where X ? ? Y j Z means X is independent
of Y given Z. In terms of the simple model of (5) and (6), i should not enter the schooling
choice equation (2 = 0): A test of misspecication of e Ii;0 is a test of whether the coecient
of Ve Ii;0 is statistically signicantly dierent from zero in the schooling choice equation.
More generally, e Ii;0 is the correct information set if Ve Ii;0 does not help to predict schooling.
We can search among candidate information sets e Ii;0 to determine which ones satisfy the
requirement that the generated Ve Ii;0 does not predict Si and what components of Y1;i Y0;i Ci
(and Y1;i   Y0;i) are predictable at the age for the specied information set.5 For a properly
specied e Ii;0, Ve Ii;0 should not cause (predict) schooling choices. The components of Ve Ii;0 that
are unpredictable are called intrinsic components of uncertainty, as dened in this paper.
Usually, we cannot determine the exact content of Ii;0 known to each agent. If we could,
we would perfectly predict Si given our decision rule. More realistically, we might nd
variables that proxy Ii;0 or their distribution. Thus, in the example of equations (5) and (6)
we would seek to determine the distribution of i and allocation of the variance of 1;i to
i and i rather than trying to estimate 1;i, i, or i for each person. This is the strategy
pursued in this paper for a two-choice model of schooling.
5This procedure is a Sims (1972) version of a Wiener-Granger causality test.
12Inference
The procedure just described is not practical for general models of educational outcomes.
We do not know all of the information possessed by the agent. We do not observe Y1;i;t and
Y0;i;t together for anyone. We must solve the problem of constructing counterfactuals. This
entails solving the selection problem.
One conventional way to solve the selection problem is to invoke a `common coecient'
assumption,
Y1;i;t = 't (Xi;t) + Y0;i;t; t = 0;::: ;T;
where 't (Xi;t) is the same for everyone with the same Xi;t. A special case is where
't (Xi;t) = '; a constant. This specication assumes that for each person i, the earn-
ings in college at age t dier from the earnings in high school by a constant, or a constant
conditional on Xi;t. Under standard assumptions, conventional econometric methods such
as matching, instrumental variables, or control functions recover 't (Xi;t) for everyone (see
Heckman and Robb, 1986, reprinted 2000, for discussions of alternative assumptions).
A common coecient returns to schooling assumption for all groups with the same values
of Xi;t rules out comparative advantage in the labor market that has been shown to be
empirically important (see Carneiro et al., 2004, and Heckman, 2001). This assumption can
be tested nonparametrically and is decisively rejected (Heckman et al., 1997). An alternative
and weaker assumption is that ranks in the distribution of Y1;i;t can be mapped into ranks
in the distribution of Y0;i;t (e.g., the best in the Y1;i;t distribution is the best in the Y0;i;t
distribution or the best in one is the worst in the other). We present evidence against that
13assumption below.
An alternative approach is to use matching. Given matching variables Qi, we can form
counterfactual marginal distributions from observed distributions using the matching as-
sumption that
F (Y1;i;t j Xi;t;Si = 1;Qi) = F (Y1;i;t j Xi;t;Si = 0;Qi)
= F (Y1;i;t j Xi;t;Qi); t = 0;:::;T:
If the matching assumptions are valid, we can construct counterfactuals for everyone since the
rst distribution is observed and the second is the distribution of the counterfactual (what
persons who do not attend college would have earned if they had attended college). By a
parallel analysis of F (Y0;i;t j Xi;t;Si = 0;Qi), we can construct F (Y0;i;t j Xi;t;Si = 1;Qi) =
F (Y0;i;t j Xi;t;Qi) for everyone, t = 0;:::;T. This is the distribution of high school out-
comes for those who attend college. The marginal distributions acquired from matching are
not enough to construct the distribution of returns Y1;i   Y0;i because they do not identify
the covariance or dependence between Y1;i;t and Y0;i;t; unless it is assumed that the only
dependence across the Y1;i;t and Y0;i;t is due to Qi and/or Xi;t, and the parameters of this
dependence can be determined from the marginal distributions, or else special assumptions
about dependence across outcomes are invoked.
Matching makes strong assumptions about the richness of the data available to analysts
and does not, in general, identify joint distributions of counterfactual returns and hence the
distribution of the rate of return. It assumes that the return to the marginal person is the
same as the return to the average person (Heckman and Navarro, 2004).
14Either matching or IV solves the selection problem under their assumed identifying
conditions. Neither method provides a way for identifying the information agents act on
ex ante. In this paper, we build on Carneiro et al. (2003) and use the factor structure
representation (3) to construct the missing counterfactual earnings data without invoking
either type of ad hoc identifying assumption.
To understand the essential idea underlying our method, consider the following linear in
parameters model:
Y0;i;t = Xi;t0;t + v0;i;t; t = 0;::: ;T;
Y1;i;t = Xi;t1;t + v1;i;t;
Ci = Zi
 + vi;C:
We assume that the life cycle of the agent ends after period T. Linearity of outcomes in
terms of parameters is convenient but not essential to our method.
Suppose that there exists a vector of factors i = (i;1;i;2;::: ;i;L) such that i;k and
i;j are mutually independent random variables for k;j = 1;::: ;L;k 6= j. Assume we can
represent the error term in earnings at age t for agent i in the following manner:
0;i;t = i0;t + "0;i;t;
1;i;t = i1;t + "1;i;t;
where 0;t and 1;t are vectors and i is a vector distributed independently across persons.
The "0;i;t and "1;i;t are mutually independent of each other and independent of the i. We
15can also decompose the cost function Ci in a similar fashion:
Ci = Zi
 + iC + "i;C:
All of the statistical dependence across potential outcomes and costs is generated by ,
X, and Z. Thus, if we could match on i (as well as X and Z), we could use matching
to infer the distribution of counterfactuals, and capture all of the dependence across the
counterfactual states through the i. However, in general, not all of the required elements
of i are observed.
The parameters C and s;t for s = 0;1; and t = 0;::: ;T are the factor loadings. "i;C
is independent of the i and the other " components. In this notation, the choice equation














 + iC + "iC)




Si = 1 if Ii  0; Si = 0 otherwise. (7)
The sum inside the parentheses is the discounted earnings of agent i in college minus the
discounted earnings of the agent in high school. The second term is cost. Constructing (7)
entails making a counterfactual comparison. Even if the earnings of one schooling level are
observed over the lifetime using panel data, the earnings in the counterfactual state are not.
After the schooling choice is made, some components of the Xi;t, the i, and the "i;t may
be revealed (e.g., unemployment rates, macro shocks) to both the observing economist and
the agent, although dierent components may be revealed to each and at dierent times.
16Examining alternative information sets, one can determine which ones produce models for
outcomes that t the data best in terms of producing a model that predicts date t = 0
schooling choices and at the same time passes our test for misspecication of predicted
earnings and costs. Some components of the error terms may be known or not known at the
date schooling choices are made. The unforecastable components are intrinsic uncertainty
as we have dened it.6
To formally characterize our empirical procedure, it is useful to introduce some additional
notation. Let  denote the Hadamard product (a  b = (a1b1;:::;aLbL)) for vectors a and
b of length L. Let X, Z, , "C, "t, t = 0;::: ;T, denote coecient vectors associated
with the X, the Z, the , the "1;t   "0;t, and the "C, respectively. These coecients will
be estimated to be nonzero in a schooling choice equation if there is a deviation between
the proposed information set and the actual information set used by agents. For a proposed
information set e Ii;0 which may or may not be the true information set on which agents act
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Zi j e Ii;0
i
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"iC j e Ii;0
i
"C;
6As pointed out to us by Lars Hansen, the term `heterogeneity' is somewhat unfortunate. Under this
term, we include trends common across all people (e.g., macrotrends). The real distinction we are making
is between components of realized earnings forecastable by agents at the time they make their schooling
choices vs. components that are not forecastable.
17To conduct our test, we t a schooling choice model based on the proposed model (8).
We estimate the parameters of the model including the  parameters. This decomposition
for e Ii assumes that agents know the , the 
, and the : We discuss this assumption in
section 5. If it is not correct, the presence of additional unforecastable components due to
unknown coecients aects the interpretation of the estimates. A test of no misspecication
of information set e Ii;0 is a joint test of the hypothesis that X = 0,  = 0, Z = 0,
"C = 0, and "t = 0, t = 0;::: ;T. That is, when e Ii;0 = Ii;0 then X = 0,  = 0,
Z = 0, "C = 0, "t = 0, t = 0;::: ;T, and the proposed choice index e Ii = Ii.
In a correctly specied model, the components associated with zero j are the unfore-
castable elements or the elements which, even if known to the agent, are not acted on in
making schooling choices. To illustrate the application of our method, assume for simplicity
that the Xi;t; the Zi; the "i;C; the 1;t;0;t; the 1;t;0;t; and C are known to the agent,
and the "j;i;t are unknown and are set at their mean zero values. We can infer which compo-
nents of the i are known and acted on in making schooling decisions if we postulate that
some components of i are known perfectly at date t = 0 while others are not known at all,
and their forecast values have mean zero given Ii;0.
If there is an element of the vector i, say i;2 (factor 2), that has nonzero loadings
(coecients) in the schooling choice equation and a nonzero loading on one or more potential
future earnings, then one can say that at the time the schooling choice is made, the agent
knew the unobservable captured by factor 2 that aects future earnings. If i;2 does not
enter the choice equation but explains future earnings, then i;2 is unknown (not predictable
by the agent) at the age schooling decisions are made. An alternative interpretation is that






is zero, i.e., that even if the component is
known, it is not acted on. Thus, we can only test for what the agent knows and acts on.
One plausible scenario is that "i;C is known but the future "1;i;t and "0;i;t are not, have
mean zero, and are insurable. If there are components of the "j;i;t that are predictable at age
t = 0, they will induce additional dependence between Si and future earnings beyond the
dependence induced by the i. Under a perfect foresight assumption we can identify this
extra dependence. We develop this point further in section 3 after we introduce additional
helpful notation. Our procedure can be generalized to consider all components of (8). We
can test the predictive power of each subset of the overall possible information set at the
date the schooling decision is being made.
The intuition underlying our testing procedure is thus very simple. The components that
are forecastable and acted on in making schooling choices are captured by the components
of ex post realizations that are known by the agents when they make their educational
choices. In terms of the simple model of equations (5) and (6), and by decomposing 1;i into
i and i so 1;i = i + i, we determine how much of the ex post variability in 1;i is due
to forecastable i and unforecastable i: The predictable components will be estimated to
have nonzero coecients in the schooling choice equation. The uncertainty at the date the
decision about college is being made is captured by the factors that the agent does not act
on when making the decision of whether or not to attend college.7
A similar but distinct idea motivates Flavin's (1981) test of the permanent income hy-
pothesis and her measurement of unforecastable income innovations. She picks a particular
7This test has been extended to a nonlinear setting, allowing for credit constraints, preferences for risk,
and the like. See Cunha et al. (2004) and Navarro (2004).
19information set e Ii;0 (permanent income constructed from an assumed ARMA (p;q) time
series process for income, where she estimates the coecients given a specied order of the
AR and MA components) and tests if Ve Ii;0 (our notation) predicts consumption. Her test
of `excess sensitivity' can be interpreted as a test of the correct specication of the ARMA
process that she assumes generates e Ii;0 which is unobserved (by the economist), although she
does not state it that way. Blundell and Preston (1998) and Blundell et al. (2004) extend her
analysis but, like her, maintain an a priori specication of the stochastic process generating
Ii;0. Blundell et al. (2004) claim to test for `partial insurance.' In fact their procedure can
be viewed as a test of their specication of the stochastic process generating the agent's in-
formation set. More closely related to our work is the analysis of Pistaferri (2001), who uses
the distinction between expected starting wages (to measure expected returns) and realized
wages (to measure innovations) in a consumption analysis.
In the context of our factor structure representation, the contrast between our approach
to identifying components of intrinsic uncertainty and the approach followed in the literature
is as follows. The traditional approach would assume that the i are known to the agent
while the f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0 are not.8 Our approach allows us to determine which components
of i and f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0 are known and acted on at the time schooling decisions are made.
Assuming that the problems raised by selection on Si are solved by the methods exposited
in the next section and their vector generalizations, we can estimate the distributions of the
components of (3) and the coecients on the factors i from panel data on earnings. This
statistical decomposition does not tell us which components of (3) are known at the time
8The analysis of Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) exemplies this approach and uses variances of ex post
income to proxy ex ante variability.
20agents make their schooling decisions. If some of the components of f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0 are
known to the agent at the date schooling decisions are made and enter (8), then additional
dependence between Si and future Y1;i   Y0;i due to the f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0, beyond that due to
i, would be estimated.
It is important to contrast the dependence between Si and future Y0;i;t;Y1;i;t arising from
i from the dependence between Si and the f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0. Some of the i in the ex post
earnings equation may not appear in the choice equation, and some additional dependence
between Si and f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0 may appear under certain information sets. The contrast
between the sources generating earnings outcomes and the sources generating dependence
between Si and "i income realized is the essential idea in this paper. The method can
be generalized to deal with nonlinear preferences and imperfect market environments.9 A
central issue, discussed in section 4, is how far one can go in identifying income information
processes without specifying preferences, insurance, and market environments.























where  is the time rate of discount, we can make a similar decomposition but it is more complicated given



































This requires some specication of G. See Carneiro et al. (2003), who assume G(Y ) = lnY and that the
equation for lnY is linear in parameters. Cunha et al. (2004) and Navarro (2004) generalize that framework
to a model with imperfect capital markets where some lending and borrowing is possible.
213 Identifying counterfactual distributions and extract-
ing components of unpredictable uncertainty using
factor models
To motivate our econometric procedures, it is useful to work with a slightly more abstract
notation and a simpler set up. Omit the individual i subscript to simplify the notation
and suppose that there is one period only (T = 0) so Y1 = Y1;0; Y0 = Y0;0. We relax
this assumption later in this section but initially use this framework to focus on the main
econometric ideas motivating our solution of the selection problem. Assume that (Y0;Y1)
have nite means and can be expressed in terms of conditioning variables X. Write
Y0 = 0 (X) + U0; (9a)
Y1 = 1 (X) + U1; (9b)
where E (U0 j X) = E (U1 j X) = 0, E (Y0 j X) = 0 (X), and E (Y1 j X) = 1 (X). The
ex post gain for an individual who moves from S = 0 to S = 1 is Y1   Y0.
Write index I as a net utility,
I = Y1   Y0   C; (10)
22where C is the cost of participation in sector 1. We write C = C(Z) + UC, where the Z
are determinants of cost. We may write
I = I(X;Z) + UI: (11)
Under perfect certainty,
I(X;Z) = 1(X)   0(X)   C(Z) and UI = U1   U0   UC.
More generally, we dene UI as the error in the choice equation and it may or may not
include all future U1, U0, or UC. Similarly, I(X;Z) may only be based on expectations of
future X and Z at the time schooling decisions are made. We write
S = 1 if I  0; S = 0 otherwise. (12)
A major advantage of our approach over previous work on estimating components of un-
certainty facing agents is that we control for the econometric consequences of endogeneity in
the choice of S and thereby avoid self-selection biases. The choice equation is also a source of
identifying information for extracting forecastable components. This paper builds on recent
research by Carneiro et al. (2003) that solves the problem of constructing counterfactuals by
identifying the joint distribution of (Y0;Y1) conditional on S (or I) using a factor structure
model. These models generalize the LISREL models of J oreskog (1977) and the MIMIC
models of J oreskog and Goldberger (1975) to produce counterfactual distributions. We now
exposit the main idea underlying our method, working with a one-factor model to simplify
23the exposition. Carneiro et al. (2003) develop the general multifactor model we use in our
empirical analysis.
3.1 Identifying counterfactual distributions
Identifying the joint distribution of potential outcomes is a dicult problem because we do
not observe both components of (Y0;Y1) for anyone. Thus, one cannot directly form the
joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y0;Y1). Heckman and Honor e (1990) show that
if (i) C = 0 for every person, (ii) decision rule (12) applies in an environment of perfect
certainty, (iii) there are distinct variables in 1(X) and 0(X), (iv) X is independent of
(U1;U0); and other mild regularity restrictions are satised, then one can identify the joint
distribution of (Y0;Y1) given X, even without additional Z variables. In this case the agents
choose S solely in terms of the dierences in potential outcomes. However, in an environment
of uncertainty or if C varies across people and contains some variables unobserved by the
analyst, this method breaks down. We present a more general analysis without maintaining
the perfect certainty assumption.
As shown by Heckman (1990), Heckman and Smith (1998), and Carneiro et al. (2003),
under the assumptions that (i) (Z;X) are statistically independent from (U0;U1;UI), (ii)
I (X;Z) is a nontrivial function of Z given X, (iii) 0 (X);1 (X), and I (X;Z) have
full support, and (iv) the elements of the pairs (0(X);I(X;Z)) and (1 (X);I(X;Z))
can be varied independently of each other, then one can identify the joint distributions of
(U0;UI), (U1;UI) up to a scale 
I for UI and also 0 (X);1 (X); and I (X;Z); the last
expression up to scale I.10 Thus, one can identify the joint distributions of (Y0;I) and
10Full support means that the support of 1(X) matches (or contains) the support of U1; the support
24(Y1;I) given X and Z where I = I=I: As a by-product we identify the mean functions.
One cannot recover the joint distribution of (Y0;Y1) or (Y0;Y1;I) given X and Z without
further assumptions. We provide an intuitive motivation for why F (Y0;I) and F(Y1;I) are
identied in Appendix 1. Once we estimate these distributions, we perform factor analysis
on (Y0;I) and (Y1;I).
The factor structure approach provides a solution to the problem of constructing coun-
terfactual distributions. We show the essential ideas. Suppose that the unobservables follow
a one-factor structure (i.e.,  is a scalar). Carneiro et al. (2003) generalize these methods
to the multifactor case. We can extend these methods to nonseparable models using the
analysis reported in Heckman, Matzkin, Navarro, and Urzua (2004), but we do not do so in
this paper.
We assume that all of the dependence across (U0;U1;UI) is generated by a scalar factor
,
U0 = 0 + "0;
U1 = 1 + "1;
UI = I + "I:






. All the "'s are mutually independent with E ("0) = E ("1) = E ("I) = 0;
V ar("0) = 2
"0; V ar("1) = 2
"1, and V ar("I) = 2
"I (the " terms are called uniquenesses in
of 0(X) matches (or contains) the support of U0 and the support of I(X;Z) matches (or contains) the
support of UI. (See Heckman and Honor e, 1990, and Carneiro et al., 2003, for more precise formulations of
these conditions.) The support of a random variable is the set of values where it has a positive density.
25factor analysis). Because the factor loadings may be dierent, the factor may aect outcomes
and choices dierently and may even have dierent signs in dierent equations.
To show how one can recover the joint distribution of (Y0;Y1) using factor models, we
break the argument into two parts. First we show how to recover the factor loadings, factor
variance, and the variances of the uniquenesses. This part is like traditional factor analysis
except that some latent variables (e.g., I) are only observed up to scale so their scale must
be normalized. Then, we show how to construct joint distributions of counterfactuals.
3.2 Recovering the factor loadings
We consider identication of the model when the analyst has dierent types of information
about the choices and characteristics of the agent.
3.2.1 The case when there is information on Y0 for I < 0 and Y1 for I > 0 and
the decision rule is (12)
Under the conditions stated in section 3.1 and the papers referenced there, after conditioning
on X and controlling for selection, one can identify F (U0;UI) and F (U1;UI). From these
distributions one can identify the left hand side of




Cov (U1;UI) = 1I
2
:
26The scale of the unobserved I is normalized, a standard condition for discrete choice
models. A second normalization that we need to impose is 2
 = 1. This is required since the
factor is not observed and we must set its scale. That is, since  = k
k for any constant k;
we need to set the scale by normalizing the variance of . We could alternatively normalize
some j to one. Finally, we set I = 1, an assumption we can relax, as noted below.
Under these conditions, we can identify 1 and 0 from the known covariances above.
From the rst covariance, we identify 0. From the second, we identify 1: From the nor-
malization, we know 2
. Since
Cov (U1;U0) = 10
2
;
we can identify the covariance between Y1 and Y0 even though we do not observe the pair
(Y1;Y0) for anyone. We then use the variances V ar(U1);V ar(U0) and the normalization




The fact that we needed to normalize both 2
 = 1 and I = 1 is a consequence of our
assumption that we have only one observation for Y1 and Y0. If we have access to more
observations on life cycle earnings from panel data, as we do in our empirical work, we can
use (Y0;0;:::Y0;T;Y1;0;:::;Y1;T) to relax one normalization, say 2
 = 1, since then we can









 from, say, Cov (U1;t;UI) = 1;t2
. Identication of the variances of the
uniquenesses follows as before.
The central idea motivating our identication strategy is that even though we never
observe (Y0;Y1) as a pair, both Y0 and Y1 are linked to S through the choice equation.
From S we can generate I, using standard methods in discrete choice analysis. From this
analysis we eectively observe (Y0;I) and (Y1;I). The common dependence of Y0 and
Y1 on I secures identication of the joint distribution of Y0;Y1;I. We next develop a
complementary strategy based on the same idea where, in addition to a choice equation,
we have a measurement equation observed for all observations whether or not Y1 or Y0
is observed. The measurement may be a test score which is a proxy for `ability' : This
measurement plays the role of I and, in certain respects, identication with a measurement
of this type is more transparent and more traditional.
3.2.2 Adding a measurement equation
Suppose that we have access to a measurement for  that is observed whether S = 1 or
S = 0 in addition to data on outcomes S and Y0 or Y1. In educational statistics, a test score
is often used to proxy ability. Suppose that the analyst has access to one ability test M for
28each person. Measured ability M is
M = M (X) + UM:
Assume that
UM = M + "M;
where "M is mutually independent from ("0;"1;"I); and .11 We assume M 6= 0: With this
additional information we can form
Cov (M;Y0jX;Z) = Cov (UM;U0) = M0
2
;




jX;Z) = Cov (UM;UI) = MI
2
:
Conditioning on (X;Z), we can recover the error terms for the unobservables U0, UI and
UM using the preceding arguments. If we impose the normalization M = 1, which can
be interpreted as requiring that higher levels of measured ability are associated with higher




11For simplicity, we assume that this is a continuous measurement. Discrete measurements can also be
used. See Carneiro et al. (2003).




and we can recover 1. From
Cov (UM;U0) = 0
2
;
we can obtain 2
. Finally, we can identify I based on information from
Cov (UM;UI) = I
2
;
so we can obtain I up to scale. Thus, with one measurement, one choice equation and
two outcomes we can identify 2
 and I up to scale. We can use the identied variances





"M. Thus, having access to a measurement (M) and choice data with decision rule
(10){(12) allows us to estimate the covariances among the counterfactual states.12
But how to identify the distributions? Traditional factor analysis assumes normality. We
present a more general nonparametric analysis. Allowing for nonnormality is essential for
getting acceptable empirical results as we note below.
12We cannot dispense with the choice equation unless we have data on F(Y0;M j X;Z) and F(Y1;M j
X;Z). Recall that, in most cases, we observe data that allows us to construct F (Y0;M j X;Z;S = 0) and
F (Y1;M j X;Z;S = 1). The required information for dispensing with the choice equation might be obtained
when we have limit sets  Zu and  Zl such that Pr(S = 1 j X;Z) = 1 for z 2  Zu and Pr(S = 0 j X;Z) = 0 for
z 2  Zl: Then we can replace I with M and do factor analysis. (See Carneiro et al., 2001.)
303.3 Recovering the distributions nonparametrically
Given the identication of factor loadings, factor variances, and uniquenesses, we show how
to identify the marginal distributions of  and "0;"1;"I nonparametrically (the last one up
to scale). The method is based on a theorem by Kotlarski (1967). For completeness, we
state his theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that we have two random variables T1 and T2 that satisfy:
T1 =  + v1
T2 =  + v2
with ;v1;v2 mutually statistically independent, E () < 1; E (v1) = E (v2) = 0; that
the conditions for Fubini's theorem are satised for each random variable, and that the
random variables possess nonvanishing (almost everywhere) characteristic functions. Then,
the densities f;fv1;fv2 are identied.
Proof See Kotlarski (1967). 
Applied to the current context, we have a choice equation, two outcome equations, and
a measurement equation.13 Assume that we normalize M = 1 so that all factor loadings,
13Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that M is continuous but our methods work for discrete
measurements. (See Carneiro et al., 2003).
31factor variances, and variances of uniquenesses are known. The system is
I
 = I (X;Z) + I + "I;
Y0 = 0 (X) + 0 + "0;
Y1 = 1 (X) + 1 + "1;
M = M (X) +  + "M:



















M   M(X) =  + "M:







1;"M. Since we know I, 0; and 1; we can identify the densities of
;"I;"0;"1;"M.14 Thus, we can identify the distributions of all of the error terms. Finally,
to recover the joint distribution of (Y1;Y0), note that
F (Y1;Y0 j X) =
Z
F (Y1;Y0 j ;X)dF ():
From Kotlarski's theorem, F() is known. Because of the factor structure, Y1;Y0; and S are
14Recall that UI is only known up to scale I.
32independent once we condition on ; so it follows that
F (Y1;Y0 j ;X) = F (Y1 j ;X)F (Y0 j ;X):
But F (Y1 j ;X) and F (Y0 j ;X) are identied once we condition on the factors since
F (Y1 j ;X;S = 1) = F (Y1 j ;X)
F (Y0 j ;X;S = 0) = F (Y0 j ;X):
Note further that if  were known to the analyst, our procedure would be equivalent to
matching on  which is equivalent, for identication, to matching on the propensity score
Pr(S = 1 j X;Z;).15 Our method generalizes matching by allowing the variables that
would produce the conditional independence assumed in matching to be unobserved by the
analyst.
The discussion in this section is for a one-factor model. In our empirical work, we use a
multifactor model where the factors are used to characterize earnings dynamics and possible
dependence between future " and S. Carneiro et al. (2003) provide the analysis we need for
the general multifactor case. The key idea is that, with enough measurements, outcomes
and choice equations, we can identify the number of factors generating dependence among
the Y1, Y0, C, S; and M and the distributions of the factors.16
15Carneiro et al. (2003) discuss the matching relationship between factor and matching models. For a
discussion of factor models and control functions, see Heckman and Navarro (2004).
16A precise statement of what is `enough' information is given in Carneiro et al. (2003). See their discussion
of the Ledermann bound. The key idea is that the number of factors has to be small relative to the number of
measurements, outcomes and choice equations. This bound can be relaxed if there are a priori restrictions on
the factor loadings beyond innocuous normalizations. Using nonnormality one can also relax the Ledermann
bound.
333.4 Models with multiple factors and tests for full insurance ver-
sus perfect certainty
Our empirical work is based on a 5 period (t = 0;::: ;4) version of equations (1) and (8).
In tting the model, we introduce the possibility of additional sources of dependence in the
choice equation (8), distinct from the dependence arising from some or all of the components
of . This additional dependence may be generated from future ("1;i;t;"0;i;t), t = 0;::: ;T
that aect schooling choices.
From the covariances between Si (or I
i ) and Y0;i;t and Y1;i;t, t = 0;::: ;T, under certain
information sets, we can identify additional sources of dependence between (Y0;i;t;Y1;i;t) and
I





In our empirical specication discussed below, there are multiple earnings outcomes in each
schooling state, a choice equation and a vector of measurement equations to tie down the
distribution of i and the distributions of the f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0.
To see how additional sources of dependence might arise in tting the data, consider a
model with perfect foresight. Following the analysis in section 3.2 and in the papers cited
there, we can estimate
Cov (Yj;i;t;I
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t ; t = 0;:::;T; j = 0;1;
where  is the variance-covariance matrix of the i: Conditional on X and Z, dependence
between Yj;i;t and I
i can arise from two sources: from the i and from the "j;i;t: Under
34complete markets, if the "j;i;t are unknown at date t = 0 and have mean zero given Ii;0,
the second term on the right hand side vanishes and the factors i capture any dependence
between Yj;i;t and Si.
Using limit set arguments, as in Carneiro et al. (2003) and Cunha et al. (2004), we can
identify the j;t, j = 0;1, t = 0;::: ;T, the distribution of i and the distributions of the
"j;i;t from earnings data alone in the limit sets.17 Under either complete markets or under
perfect foresight, we can identify C up to scale 
I from the covariances between Yj;i;t, and
I
i , provided a rank condition is satised. In the case of scalar i, we can identify C for a
xed scale of I




























Since we know all of the ingredients on the left hand side, we can identify C up to scale 
I.
If there is an element of X not in Z, we can identify the scale 
I (See equation (7)). Since
C is overidentied if T > 0, we can test between a perfect foresight model and a complete
contingent claims model by checking if the same C is estimated for dierent Cov (Yj;i;t;I)
terms.18 In the complete contingent claims model with uncertainty, the middle term in the
brackets would be zero for all "j;i;t.19
17Footnote 12 denes the limit sets. See Carneiro et al. (2003) for a more complete discussion of identi-
cation in limit sets.









is constant across all t.




t=0 (1;t   0;t)
(1 + r)
t 6= 0
holds for a collection of L terms of the covariances of Yj;i;t with I
i where L is the number of factors.
354 More general preferences and market settings
To focus on the main ideas regarding model identication in this paper, we have deliberately
used the simple market structures of complete contingent claims markets. What can be
identied in more general environments? In the absence of perfect certainty or perfect
risk sharing, preferences and market environments also determine schooling choices. The
separation theorem we have used to this point breaks down.
If we postulate information processes a priori, and preferences up to some unknown
parameters as in Flavin (1981), Blundell and Preston (1998), and Blundell et al. (2004), we
can identify departures from specied market structures. In Cunha et al. (2004), we postulate
an Aiyagari (1994) { Laitner (1992) economy with one asset and parametric preferences to
identify the information processes in the agent's information set. We take a parametric
position on preferences and a nonparametric position on the economic environment and the
information set.
An open question, not yet fully resolved in the literature, is how far one can go in non-
parametrically jointly identifying preferences, market structures and information sets. In
Cunha et al. (2004), we add consumption data to the schooling choice and earnings data
to secure identication of risk preference parameters (within a parametric family) and in-
formation sets, and to test among alternative models for market environments. Alternative
assumptions about what analysts know produce dierent interpretations of the same evi-
dence. The lack of full insurance interpretation given to their empirical results by Flavin
(1981) and Blundell et al. (2004) may be a consequence of their misspecication of the
agent's information set generating process. We discuss this point further in section 5 when
36we present our estimates, to which we now turn.
5 Empirical results
We rst describe our data and estimating equations. We then discuss the estimates obtained
from our model, and their economic implications.
5.1 The data, equations, and estimation
Appendix 2 considers a practical problem that plagues life cycle analysis. Few data sets
contain the full life cycle of earnings along with the test scores and schooling choices needed
to directly estimate our model and extract components of uncertainty. We need to combine
data sets. Otherwise, we can only obtain partial identication of the model. In our empirical
analysis, we use a sample of white males from the NLSY data pooled with PSID data, as
described in Appendix 3 (found at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Hicks2004/), to produce life
cycle data on earnings and schooling.
Following the preceding theoretical analysis, we consider only two schooling choices: high
school and college graduation. From now on we use c;h to denote college and high school,
respectively. `c' corresponds to 1 and `h' corresponds to 0 in the previous notation. For
simplicity and familiarity, in this paper we assume complete contingent claims markets.
Because we assume that all shocks are idiosyncratic, schooling choices are made on the basis
of expected present value income maximization. Carneiro et al. (2003) assume the absence
of any credit markets or insurance. One of the goals of this paper is to check whether their
empirical ndings about components of income inequality are robust to dierent assumptions
37about the operation of the credit market and insurance markets. Cunha et al. (2004) estimate
an Aiyagari-Laitner economy with a single asset and borrowing constraints and discuss risk
aversion and the relative importance of uncertainty.
The method developed in this paper is based on the idea that some or all components
of expected future earnings may aect current choices. In order to gain some preliminary
insights on whether components of future earnings (and returns) aect current schooling
choices, we present a simple empirical analysis in Table 1. Using the sample described below
and in Appendix 3 (found at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Hicks2004/), we regress log ex post
earnings on schooling and schooling interacted with an ability test (ASVAB) to obtain an
estimate of the ex post return to schooling under the assumption that, conditional on the test
score, the ex post return is the same for everyone.20 This is a form of matching estimator
as described in Section 2. Assuming that the conditioning variable controls for selection,
we use the estimated return to schooling and plug it into a schooling choice model to test
whether future earnings aect college choices. In order to account for possible selection
biases not controlled for by matching, we repeat the exercise using instrumental variables
estimates of returns instead.21 The matching (OLS) estimator is reported in the rst row
of Table 1. The IV estimator is reported in the second row. The estimated eects of
these estimators on schooling choices are given in the third and fourth rows. For either
estimation method, we nd statistically signicant evidence that estimated ex post returns
aect current schooling choices. This evidence suggests that some components of future
earnings may predict schooling.
20We only use the NLSY sample because of the availability of instruments in it.
21See Heckman and Navarro (2004) for an exposition of the strong conditions required for this to be a
valid procedure.
38However, this evidence is not decisive. The estimates do not clearly delineate what is
unknown to the agent at the time schooling choices are made. They also do not distinguish
between the role of ability in generating future earnings from the role of ability in reducing
costs of schooling. The procedure developed in this paper makes these distinctions. We can
also determine the information set facing agents using the method developed in the previous
sections, which we now apply.22
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the data used to estimate the model. College
graduates have higher present value of earnings than high school graduates. College gradu-
ates also have higher test scores, come from better family backgrounds, and are more likely
to live in a location where college tuition is lower.
To simplify the empirical analysis, we divide the lifetimes of individuals into 5 periods.
The rst period covers ages 19 through 28, the second goes from 29 through 38, the third
from 39 to 48, the fourth from 49 to 58, and the fth from 59 to 65. For each schooling
level s, s 2 fc;hg, and for each period t, we calculate the present value of earnings as of age
19; Ys;t:23 To simplify notation drop the `i' subscript. If Ys;t is generated by a three factor
model, we would write:
Ys;t = Xs;t + 1s;t;1 + 2s;t;2 + 3s;t;3 + "s;t for t = 0;1;2;3;4; s 2 fc;hg: (13)
It turns out that a three factor model is all that is required to t the data. Since the scales
22A better test would be based on variables that more plausibly aect returns but not schooling, except
through returns. Labor market prices for dierent schooling levels are one plausible candidate.
23In our empirical work we use a 3% interest rate. We assume it is constant. It would be useful to explore
alternative time series of interest rates based on the data actually facing our cohorts. Alternative choices of
constant interest rates do no aect the main qualitative ndings about the relative importance of forecastable
heterogeneity.
39of the factors are unknown, it is necessary to normalize some loadings (the ). In this paper,
we set h;0;2 = h;2;3 = 1: The normalization for ability (associated with the measurements
M based on test scores) is presented in the next paragraph. Using the identication scheme
of Carneiro et al. (2003) for the factor loadings, we also normalize s;t;3 = 0, for t = 0 and
t = 1 and for s = c and s = h. This normalization has the substantive interpretation that
3 aects earnings only in the third and subsequent periods. Thus, 3 is associated with
mid-career wage developments.
For the measurement system for cognitive ability (M in the notation of section 3.2.2)
we use ve components of the ASVAB test battery: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension, math knowledge and coding speed. We dedicate the rst factor
(1) to this test system, and exclude the others from it. This justies our interpretation of 1
as ability. We include family background variables among the covariates XM in the ASVAB
test equations. In Table 2.2 we list the elements of XM: Formally, let Mj denote the test
score j,
Mj = XM!j + 1testj;1 + "testj: (14)
To set the scale of 1, we normalize test1;1 = 1.
The cost function C is given by
C = Z
 + 1C;1 + 2C;2 + "C; (15)
where the Z are variables that aect the costs of going to college and include variables that
40do not aect outcomes Ys;t such as local tuition. Table 2.2 shows the full set of covariates
used, and the exclusions (the variables in Z not in X.) We include tuition among the
elements of Z but allow for a more general notion of costs in our empirical work, including
psychic costs.








  E0 (C); (16)
where E0 denotes the information set under I0 and r is the interest rate. Individuals go to
college if I > 0: The individual decision maker is assumed to be the child although parental
resources can aect C. Cost variable C also includes the eect of ability on reducing tuition
costs. We test and do not reject the hypothesis that individuals, at the time they make college
going decisions, know their cost functions, the Z and the X, factors 1;2; and unobservables
in cost "C: However, they do not know factor 3; or "s;t; s 2 fc;hg, t 2 f0;1;2;3;4g; at
the time they make their educational choices. Addition of these components to the choice
equation does not improve the t of the model to the data.24
















and pk;j > 0: As shown in Ferguson (1983), mixtures of normals with a large number of
24We use `t' statistics in the choice equation to determine whether additional factors enter the choice
equation. We use 2 goodness of t measures to determine if additional factors are required.
41components approximate any distribution of k arbitrarily well in the `1 norm. The "s;t are
also assumed to be generated by mixtures of normals. We estimate the model using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods as described in Carneiro et al. (2003). In Tables 2:3   2:5 we
present estimated coecients and factor loadings. For all factors, a two-component model
(Jk = 2; k = 1;::: ;3) is adequate.25
5.2 Empirical results
5.2.1 How the model ts the data
To assess the validity of our estimates and to assess the number of factors we need and the
number of components of the mixtures that are required, we perform a variety of checks of t
of predictions against the data. We rst compare the proportions of people who choose each
schooling level. In the NLSY data, 52.9% choose high school and 47.1% choose college. The
model predicts roughly 53.2% and 46.8%, respectively. The model replicates the observed
proportions remarkably well, and formal tests of equality of predicted and actual proportions
cannot be rejected at the 5% signicance level. This is also true when we partition the data
on subsets of X and Z:
Figures 1.1{1.5 show the densities of the predicted and actual present values of earnings
for the overall sample of the pooled NLSY-PSID data sets.26 The t is good. When we
perform formal tests of equality of predicted and actual overall distributions at the 5% level,
the model marginally fails to t the data for the overall sample for the rst, third and
25Additional components do not improve the goodness of t of the model to the data.
26The earnings are pretax. It would be better to use post-tax earnings and we propose to do so in
subsequent work.
42last periods (see Table 3a). However, addition of factors and additional components of the
mixture of normals do not signicantly improve the t. Reducing the number of factors by
one substantially reduces the overall t (see Table 3b). Figures 2.1{2.5 and 3.1{3.5, show
the same densities restricted to the sample of those who choose high school (sequence 2) and
college (sequence 3). The t is also good. The model ts the data better when we perform
formal tests of equality of predicted and actual distributions for each schooling choice than it
does overall, suggesting the failure of t is due to the failure to predict mean dierences. As
is apparent from Table 3a, the only case in which the model does not pass the 2 goodness
of t test is for the high-school distribution of earnings in period 4. We conclude that a
three factor model with our normalizations ts the data. From this analysis, we conclude
that earnings innovations "s;t in a three factor model are not in the agents' information sets
at the time they are making schooling decisions. If they were, additional factors would be
required to capture the full covariance between educational choices and future earnings.27
5.2.2 The factors: non-normality and evidence on selection
Figure 4 reveals that in order to t the data, one must allow for non-normal factors. The
gure plots the estimated densities of the factors along normal versions with the same mean
and variance. None of the factors is normally distributed. A traditional assumption used in
factor analysis (see J oreskog, 1977) is violated. Our approach is more general and does not
require normality.
Figure 5.1 plots the density of factor 1 conditional on educational choices. The solid line
is the density of factor 1 for agents who are high school graduates, while the dashed line is
27Cunha et al. (2004) consider application of alternative testing and model selection criteria.
43the density of the factor for agents who are college graduates. Since factor 1 is associated
with cognitive tests, we can interpret it as an index of `ability' . The agents who choose
college have, on average, higher ability. Factor 1 is estimated from a test score equation that
controls for parental background and level of education at the date the ASVAB tests are
taken. Figure 5.1 shows that selection on ability is an important factor in explaining college
attendance. A similar analysis of factor 2 that is presented in Fig. 5.2 reveals that schooling
decisions are not very much aected by it, while we see no evidence of selection by schooling
level on factor 3 (see Fig. 5.3). This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that at
the time agents make their schooling decisions, they do not know factor 3. Agents cannot
select on factors they do not know when they are making their schooling decisions.
5.2.3 Estimating joint distributions of ex ante and ex post counterfactuals:
returns, costs, and ability as determinants of schooling
A major contribution of this paper is the identication and estimation of ex ante and ex
post distributions of outcomes and returns without imposing special assumptions about the
dependence across potential outcomes. Letting E0 denote the expectation under the ex ante
information set I0, we construct the distribution of (Y0;Y1) (ex post) and of (E0 (Y0);E0 (Y1))
ex ante conditional on X: The X are assumed to be known both ex ante and ex post. The




44while the ex ante gross return is






Both population heterogeneity and uncertainty produce the randomness generating R: Pop-
ulation heterogeneity in I0 (information sets) produces the randomness generating E0 (R):
A standard argument shows that the means of R and E0 (R) over the entire population, and
on any conditioning subset, are the same.
In estimating the distribution of earnings in counterfactual schooling states within a
policy regime (e.g., the distributions of college earnings for people who actually choose to be
high school graduates under a particular tuition policy), one standard approach is to assume
that both distributions are the same except for an additive constant|the coecient of a
schooling dummy in an earnings regression possibly conditioned on the covariates. Recently
developed methods relax this assumption by assuming preservation of ranks across potential
outcome distributions, but do not freely specify the two outcome distributions (see Heckman
et al., 1997; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005; Shaikh and Vytlacil, 2004).
Table 4.1 presents the ex post conditional distribution of college earnings given high school
earnings decile by decile. If the dependence across outcomes were perfect and positive, the
diagonal elements would be `1' and the o diagonal elements would be `0.' There is negative
dependence between the relative positions of individuals in the two distributions, and the
dependence is far from perfect. For example, almost 10% of those who are at the sixth decile
of the ex post high school distribution would be in the eighth decile of the ex post college
distribution.
45Note that this comparison is not made in terms of positions in the overall distribution of
earnings. We can determine where individuals are located in the population distribution of
potential high school earnings and the population distribution of potential college earnings
although in the data we only observe individuals in either one or the other state. The
assumption of perfect dependence across factual and counterfactual distributions that is
often made in the literature is incorrect for the data we analyze.
While Table 4.1 is the conditional distribution of ex post earnings across people, Ta-
ble 4.2 presents the conditional distribution of population ex ante college earnings on high
school earnings decile by decile. These conditional distributions are produced by allowing
X;1;2;"C to vary across persons as they do in the population, but integrating out the
unknown "s;t, s = c;h, t = 0;::: ;4, and 2. (In Table 4.1, these components contribute to
the measured variability.) The ex ante conditional distribution shows less dispersion than
the distribution of ex post outcomes since components of future realizations are integrated
out. Ex ante, agents forecast more negative dependence across counterfactual earnings states
than the ex post dependence on realized earnings. Realized 3 and the f"s;tg
4
t=0 are forces
toward positive dependence. The distinction between ex ante and ex post counterfactual dis-
tributions is a major contribution of this paper and demonstrates that information revelation
is an important aspect of life cycle decision making.
Our ability to distinguish ex ante outcomes from ex post outcomes highlights a major
advantage of our approach over conventional instrumental variable and matching approaches
to estimating returns to education which focus on ex post returns. Decisions are made ex
ante. Outcomes are measured ex post. It is the ex ante return that agents act on but the ex





(1+r)t  C. Using our empirical model, we present three sets of estimates:
(i) Ex ante returns based on ex ante choices E0 (R j E0 (I)  0) and E0 (R j E0 (I) < 0); (ii)
Ex post returns based on choices made with ex ante information (R j E0 (I)  0);(R j E0 (I) < 0)
(what is usually presented in the literature on `program evaluation') and (iii) Ex post re-
turns based on ex post choices (R j I  0);(R j I < 0). The last set of returns conveys how
returns and choices would dier if agents could `do it over again,' i.e., make decisions based
on hindsight. The same people are used to form measures (i) and (ii). For measure (iii),
agents are allowed to change their schooling choices with hindsight.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present, respectively, the tted and counterfactual marginal distri-
butions of ex post earnings for high school and college graduates. Figure 6.1 reveals that
high school graduates are more likely to be successful in the high school sector than those
who attend college. In Fig. 6.2, we compare the densities of present value of earnings in the
college sector for persons who choose college with the counterfactual distributions of college
earnings for high school graduates. The density of the present value of earnings for college
graduates is to the right of the counterfactual density of the present value of earnings of
high school graduates if they were college graduates. The surprising feature of both gures
is that the overlap of the distributions is substantial. Ex post, many high school graduates
would have large earnings as college graduates. This suggests the importance of costs and
expectational elements in explaining schooling decisions. The densities of ex ante earnings
is more compressed than the densities of ex post earnings (see Figs 6.3 and 6.4) but the
28As Hicks (1946, p.179) puts it, `Ex post calculations of capital accumulation have their place in economic
and statistical history; they are a useful measuring for economic progress; but they are of no use to theoretical
economists who are trying to nd out how the system works, because they have no signicance for conduct.'
47patterns are similar re
ecting the fact that most of the measured variability in earnings
is due to heterogeneity. The densities under perfect certainty (Figs 6.5 and 6.6) for high
school and college, respectively, show a much sharper separation between the earnings in
the choice taken and the counterfactual earnings. Using hindsight, people would make wiser
choices, and separate out more sharply, but there is still considerable overlap between the
two distributions for both schooling choices.
Tables 5.1{5.4 provide further evidence on the importance of distinguishing between ex
ante and ex post returns. In Table 5.1, we report the estimated and counterfactual ex post
present value of earnings for agents who choose high school. The typical high school student
would earn $605.92 thousand dollars over the life cycle. She would earn $969.34 thousand if
she had chosen to be a college graduate.29 This implies a lifetime return of 117% to a college
education over the whole life cycle (i.e., a monetary gain of $363.42 thousand dollars for
four years of college). In Table 5.2, we note that the typical college graduate earns $1,007.64
thousand dollars (above the counterfactual earnings of a typical high school student), and
would make only $536.43 thousand dollars over her lifetime if she chose to be a high school
graduate instead. The lifetime returns to college education for the typical college graduate
(which in the literature on program evaluation is referred to as the eect of Treatment on
the Treated) is 133%, above that of the return for a high school graduate.
Table 5.3 reports the ex post earnings in high school and college and returns to college for
people indierent between college and high school. Not surprisingly, people on the margin
of indierence have returns that are intermediate between those who go to college and those
who go to high school.
29These numbers may appear to be large but are a consequence of using only a 3% discount rate.
48Table 5.4 presents rates of return to college under dierent assumptions about agent
information, for people who choose high school, for people who choose college and for those
at the margin of indierence between going to college or not. The persons at the margin
are more likely to be aected by a policy that encourages college attendance, and their
returns should be used to compute the marginal benet of policies that induce people into
schooling.30
Ex ante and ex post mean returns must be the same for any subpopulation if agents use
the information available to them. The mean returns under perfect certainty are dierent
from the other returns because of resorting by persons into schooling in response to the in-
formation revealed after initial college choices are made. Some people would choose dierent
levels of schooling if they had hindsight. Returns to college for those choosing high school
in hindsight would be lower; returns to college would be higher. For those on the margin of
indierence, the returns are about the same under perfect certainty as they are in the other
two experiments reported in the table.
While ex ante and ex post mean returns must be identical, the ex ante and ex post
distributions are not.31 Figure 7.1 plots the density of ex post returns to education for
agents who are high school graduates (the solid curve), and the density of ex post returns
to education for agents who are college graduates (the dashed curve). College graduates
30Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) develop an alternative method for estimating the ex post return to
persons at the margin of attending school.
31Let W1 = (;1) be the outcome in period `1.' The agent in period `0' knows (;0). The ex ante
mean value of W1 given  and 0 is
E0 (W1 j ;0) =
Z
(;1)dF (1 j ;0)
where F (a j b) is the distribution of a given b: The ex post mean of W1 given (;1) is (;1). The ex
post mean of W1 given () is E (W1 j ) =
R
(;1)dF (1 j ) averaging over (;0) and E (W1;) over 
produces the same mean outcome. This is true for any central moment.
49have returns distributed `to the right' of high school graduates, so the dierence is not only
a dierence for the mean individual but is actually present over the entire distribution.
Agents who choose a college education are the ones who tend to gain more from it.
Figure 7.2 presents the ex ante returns for college and high school students. These
densities are not much dierent from that of the ex post densities. Figure 7.3 shows the
densities of returns for those who would choose high school and college in an environment of
perfect certainty. Clearly, the distributions are more sharply separated. Uncertainty reduces
the force of comparative advantage emphasized by Roy (1951).
Figure 8 shows the estimated densities of the monetary value of cost, both overall and
by schooling level. College is less costly for those who attend college. `Psychic costs' can
stand in for expectational errors and attitudes towards risk. We do not distinguish among
these explanations in this paper. The estimated costs are too large to be due to tuition costs
alone.
It is important to note that our cost estimates are critically dependent on the assumption
that the , ; and 
 are known by the agent. If the agent cannot accurately forecast future
prices, and the prices are random variables but statistically independent of the  (as would
be plausible, since the prices are set in national markets and the  are individual specic),
then what we are calling estimated costs include expectational errors (see Carneiro et al.,
2003).32 In the absence of cost data, and data on expectations, this ambiguity is intrinsic and
highlights the importance of maintained assumptions in interpreting evidence on schooling
32This is obvious from expression (2.8). If the , ; and 
 are random variables from the point of view of
the agent using information set e Ii;0, and are independent of X, Z; and , then expectational errors enter
symmetrically with cost shocks. Thus, consider the rst two terms in (2.8) associated with the X and .
Analyzing the contribution of expectations about  to the total error term in the schooling choice index,
50choices.
In the human capital literature, a conventional maintained assumption used when com-
puting rates of return from measured earnings data is that direct costs are only a small
fraction of total earnings (see Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2004). Our evidence casts
doubt on the validity of this assumption. Psychic costs (including expectational forecast
errors) are a sizeable component of the net return, and they explain why agents who face
high gross returns do not go to college. Ignoring direct costs overstates the rates of return.
The existence of large ex post returns that could be realized by high school students who do
not attend college are attributable in our model to psychic costs and expectational errors in
some unknown proportion.
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where, as before,  is a Hadamard product, and  and X; are dened as coecients analogous to
the coecients used in (2.8). A comparable expression can be derived for the other coecients if they are
random. The expectational errors about the coecients are an additional source of variability in outcomes
that cannot be distinguished from variations due to the expectational errors in the X without using additional
information. See the second and fourth terms and note they they would enter "C as we have dened it in
the previous sections and would hence be con
ated with costs.
515.2.4 How well can agents predict future earnings?
In Figs 9.1 through 9.3, we separate the eect of heterogeneity (total unobserved variance)
from uncertainty in earnings. These calculations are reported for the population as a whole.
Figure 9.1 plots the densities of the present value of earnings for the agent, using dierent
information sets, denoted by . First, consider the case in which the agent has no informa-
tion about the  or the f"0;t;"1;tg
T
t=0. The Z;X;"C, and the model coecients are assumed
to be known in all of these simulations. They are set at mean values. The choice of means
aects the locations but not the shapes of the densities. The "s;t are unknown and various
assumptions about which the agent knows are tested. Note that the density has a large vari-
ance, if the agent knows only factor 1, i.e., the factors in the information set are  = f1g.33
In this case, the reduction in the forecast from knowing ability only from knowledge of her
cognitive ability adds little to the forecast of her future earnings. Now, assume that the
agent is given knowledge of factor 2 as well, so that  = f1;2g. Note that knowledge of
factor 2 causes a substantial reduction in the variance of the present value of earnings in
high school. Thus, while factor 2 does not greatly aect college choices, it greatly informs
the agent about her future earnings. When the agent is given knowledge of factors 1, 2,
and 3, that is,  = f1;2;3g; she can forecast earnings somewhat better. However, our
analysis suggests that agents do not know factor 3. Figure 9.2 reveals much the same story
about college earnings, except that knowledge of factor 3 now substantially increases the
predictability of college earnings.
Knowledge of the factors enables agents to make better forecasts of returns. Figure 9.3
33As opposed to the econometrician who never gets to observe the .
52presents the same type of exercise regarding information sets available to the agent for returns
to college (Y1   Y0). Knowledge of factor 2 also helps the agents forecast their gains better.
Almost 48% of the variability in returns is forecastable at age 19. Knowledge of factor 3,
which is not known at age 19, would greatly improve predictability of future earnings.
Table 6.1 presents the variance of potential lifetime earnings in each state, and returns
under dierent information sets available to the agent. Tables 6.1{6.6 are calculated for the
entire population. Note that in Table 6.1 knowledge of factor 2 is quantitatively important
in reducing forecast variance of lifetime earnings for college and high school. Factor 3 is more
powerful but, according to our estimates, it is not known by the agent at age 19. Tables 6.2{
6.6 show the period by period predictability of discounted earnings from the vantage point
of age 19 when the agent knows only 1 and 2. Earnings in later periods are less predictable
than earnings in earlier periods using only factors one and two. Quantitatively, factors 2 and
3 are important in predicting future earnings and returns whereas ability (factor 1) is not.
This discussion sheds light on the issue of distinguishing predictable components of het-
erogeneity from uncertainty. We have demonstrated that there is a large dispersion in the
distribution of the present value of earnings. This dispersion is largely due to heterogeneity,
which is forecastable by the agents at the time they are making their schooling choices.
The remaining dispersion is due to luck (uncertainty) or unforecastable errors regarding the
coecients as of age 19. Since any measurement errors in ex post earnings are allocated
to uncertainty, our estimates arguably underestimate the degree of predictability of future
earnings known to the agents at age 19.
535.2.5 Ex ante choices versus choices under perfect certainty
Once the distinction between heterogeneity and uncertainty is made, we can talk meaning-
fully about the distinction between ex ante and ex post decision making. From our analysis,
we conclude that, at the time agents pick their schooling, f"0;i;t;"1;i;tg
T
t=0 and 3 in their
earnings equations are unknown to them. These are the components that correspond to
`luck' as dened by Jencks et al. (1972). It is clear that schooling choices would be dierent,
at least for some individuals, if they knew the realized components of earnings. If agents







t   C > 0
S = 1 if I > 0; S = 0 otherwise,
where no expectation is taken to calculate I since all components are known with certainty
by the agents.
In our empirical model, if individuals could pick their schooling level using their ex post
information (i.e., after learning their luck components in earnings), 25:19% of high school
graduates would rather be college graduates and 31:40% of college graduates would have
stopped at the high school level. Uncertainty about future outcomes greatly aects schooling
choices, and there is plenty of scope for ex post regret.34
34In a companion paper (Cunha et al., 2005), we address issues similar to the ones addressed in this paper
but use a more ad hoc approach to pooling data across samples to construct a life cycle data set. That
procedure follows Carneiro et al. (2003) rather than the more rigorous methodology derived in Appendix 2.
That paper shows even less uncertainty than we have shown here and establishes a strong correlation across
latent skill levels, which is positive. We are much more condent in the empirical results in this paper than
546 Summary and conclusions
This paper discusses the problem of separating heterogeneity from uncertainty. We develop
and apply a method for estimating both heterogeneity and uncertainty from ex post earnings
data and from schooling choices. We estimate substantial predictable and unpredictable
components of earnings as of age 19. Agents have greater diculty in predicting outcomes
in later periods of their life cycles than they do in earlier periods. Procedures that equate
variability with uncertainty overstate risk and, hence, understate the pricing of risk. If agents
knew their ex post earnings outcomes resulting from their schooling choices, a substantial
fraction (around 30%) would change their schooling decisions. Hicks' distinction between ex
ante and ex post is an empirically important one.
This paper takes a rst step toward resolving an empirical puzzle in the labor economics
literature. Ex post returns to college are high for those who stop at high school. Our evidence
is that, within a complete markets setting, psychic costs of schooling (and expectational er-
rors in a more general model) account for this phenomenon. This evidence has importance
implications for the conventional human capital literature that ignores these costs in comput-
ing rates of return to schooling. However, a story that relies on psychic costs to explain the
puzzle is not entirely satisfactory. One needs to account more systematically for borrowing
constraints and risk aversion, and we do so elsewhere in Carneiro et al. (2003), Cunha et al.
(2004), and Navarro (2004).
Throughout this paper we have maintained the assumption of complete markets for id-
iosyncratic components of risk. An open question which we address, but do not solve, is how
in the results reported in the previous paper.
55to simultaneously identify constraints (market structure), preferences and information con-
fronting agents. Dierent scholars focus on dierent aspects of the decision problem facing
agents. Those who postulate specic information structures and the preferences of agents
test for alternative market structures (e.g., partial insurance). In this paper, we have esti-
mated information structures, making assumptions about market structures and constraints
that neutralize the eects of risk preferences and uncertainty on schooling choices.
In Cunha et al. (2004), we build on the analysis of this paper to estimate an Aiyagari
(1994) { Laitner (1992) economy and simultaneously identify preferences (within a paramet-
ric family) and information sets allowing for market incompleteness. We extend the analysis
of Carneiro et al. (2003) by considering more 
exible parameterizations of preferences against
risk aversion and allowing for restricted lending and borrowing. (They assume an environ-
ment of complete autarky). A robust nding across all environments we have studied is
that uncertainty is empirically important. Hicks' important distinction between ex ante and
ex post income receives substantial empirical support in the data on schooling choice and
earnings, and changes the way we interpret a vast empirical literature on ex post returns to
schooling.
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Appendix 1 A motivation for the nonparametric iden-
tication of the joint distribution of out-
comes and the binary choice equation
The following intuition motivates conditions under which F(Y0;I j X;Z) is identied. A
formal proof is given in Carneiro et al. (2003). A parallel argument holds for F(Y1;I j X;Z).
First, under the conditions given in Cosslett (1983), Manski (1988), and Matzkin (1992), we
can identify
I(X;Z)
I from Pr(S = 1 j X;Z) = Pr(I(X;Z) + UI  0 j X;Z). We can also
identify the distribution of
UI
I .35 Second, from this information and F(Y0 j S = 0;X;Z) =
35An alternative to the conventional approach, which requires large support conditions, postulates that
I(X;Z) = X
X + Z
Z and normalizes one coecient on a continuous coordinate of Z, say Z1, to unity
(e.g., 
Z1 = 1). Then, xing the remaining values of X and Z at specied values (X = x, ^ Z = ^ z, where
^ Z is Z removed of its rst coordinate) and tracing Z1 over its support, we identify the distribution of UI
over the support of Z1, assumed to lie in an interval [CL;CU) which may or may not be the support of UI.
57Pr(Y0  y0 j I(X;Z) + UI  0;X;Z), we can form
F(Y0 j S = 0;X;Z)Pr(S = 0 j X;Z) = Pr(Y0  y0;I
  0 j X;Z):
The left hand side of this expression is known (we observe Y0 when S = 0 and we know the














I and can vary it for each xed X: In particular if I(X;Z) gets small
(I(X;Z) !  1) we can recover the marginal distribution Y0 from which we can recover
0(X).
Using (9a), we can express this probability as
Pr










Assuming UI is absolutely continuous, we can thus identify




Since Pr(S = 1 j X;Z) = FUI (X
X + Z




UI (Pr(S = 1 j X;Z)) = X
X + Z
Z
and identify the coecients 
X, 
Z provided that (X;Z) is of full rank. However, if the support of UI











where FUI(CU)   FUI(CL) is unknown.
















Notice the three key ingredients. (i) The independence of (U0;UI) and (X;Z). (ii) The
assumption that we can set
I(X;Z)
I to be very small (so we get the marginal distribution
of Y0 and hence 0(X)). (iii) The assumption that
I(X;Z)
I can be varied independently of







Appendix 2 Combining data sets to estimate a life cy-
cle model
A serious empirical problem plagues most life cycle analyses. It is a rare data set that includes
the full life cycle earnings experiences of persons along with their test scores, measurements,
schooling choices, and background variables. Many data sets like the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY 79) have partial information up to some age. A few other data
sets (e.g., the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics or PSID) have full information on some
life cycle variables but lack the detail of the richer data which provide information only on
truncated life cycles. This section considers two issues: (i) What can be identied from
the truncated life cycle data and (ii) What can be learned from combining the truncated
data with a data set with fewer variables but with information on schooling and earnings on
entire life cycles? Our factor model provides a natural framework for combining samples to
59produce identication even when the model is not identied in each sample.
To x ideas and motivate the empirical work, suppress the individual i subscripts and
write
Ys;t = Xs;t + 1s;t;1 + 2s;t;2 + 3s;t;3 + "s;t; t = 0;::: ;4; s = 0;1; (17)





t 1E (Y1;t   Y0;t j I0)   E (Cost j I0) > 0;














E (j j I0)(1;t;j   0;t;j) + E ("1;t   "0;t j I0)
#




E (j j I0)(C;j)   E ("C j I0)  0;
where Z may include elements in common with X: It will prove convenient to write the
choice equation in reduced form letting Q combine X and Z:
I = Q
I + 1I;1 + 2I;2 + 3I;3 + "I; (18)
where "I is the composite of the errors from the choice equation. Finally, the external
60measurements are written as
Mk = XMM;k + 1M;k;1 + "M;k; k = 1;::: ;K;
where K is the number of measurements (test scores in our application). For the case in
which we have access to full life cycle data, the contribution to the likelihood of an individual











f (Mkj;XM)dF (); (19)
where it is assumed that the (X;Z) are independent of  and the " and  is the support of
. Identication follows from the analysis of Carneiro et al. (2003).
Now, suppose that we only have access to a sample A in which we only observe some of
the variables at early stages of the life cycle. In particular, assume that sample A does not
include observations on fYs;tg
4
t=2 as is the case with the NLSY, which contains no information
on earnings after age 43.






























f (Mkj;XM)dF ():36 (20)
We integrate out earnings for the periods in which we do not observe them. Using the rst
36If she had chosen S = 0 then we would write Pr(I < 0jZ;) instead.
61two periods of data, we can identify a model in which we have K external measurements, 2
time periods for earnings, and a reduced form schooling equation that combines parameters
of earnings with cost parameters. For K  3, from the measurements conditional on X we
can form
Cov (Mk;Mk0 j XM) = M;kM;k0
2
1: 37
Taking ratios of these covariances, we can identify the factor loadings up to one normaliza-
tion.38 We can identify the distributions of the error terms for measurements. From these,
we can identify the distributions of 1;f"kg
K
k=1 nonparametrically by using Kotlarski's the-
orem. Then, under the support assumptions in Carneiro et al. (2003), and noting that we
have identied 2
1; we can form
Cov (Mk;Ys;t j XM;X) = M;ks;t;1
2
1; s = 0;1; t = 0;1;
and identify the loadings on the rst factor for each s for t = 0;1:39 From the covariances of
I
I with either M or Ys;t, we can identify the factor loadings associated with (18) up to scale
I.
Once we identify all of the parameters related to 1 we can, for each schooling level s
37Or if K  2 and we use either the choice equation or one of the earnings equations. See Carneiro et al.
(2003).
38The means of the functions (and so the k) are trivially identied from E (1) = E (2) = E ("s;t) = 0:
39As before, given the support conditions the means are identied from the mean zero assumptions on the
error term.
62(remember that s;t;3 = 0 for t = 0;1), form









2; t = 0;1;
where the left hand side is known and the loadings on factor 1 are identied up to scale
from earnings and choice. Recall that the third factor does not enter the earnings equations
for t = 0;1: We can then solve for the loadings on 2 in the earnings and choice equations.







have at least one exclusion (one continuous element of Z not in X). Notice that, since we
are not able to identify any of the parameters of earnings for t > 1, we cannot identify all
of the structural parameters in the choice equation so we cannot separate the eect of costs
from the eect of future earnings.
Now, suppose that we have access to a second independent sample B that is generated
by the same process that generates sample A:40 In this second sample, we do not observe
fMkg
K
k=1 but we do observe earnings and schooling choices (and X and Z) for all time
periods. For sample B, an individual with S = 1 has a contribution to the likelihood that
























Pr(I  0jZ;)dF (): (21)
40By this we mean that the parameters and distributions of the implied random variables of both samples
are the same.
63From this sample alone we cannot recover the loadings or the marginal distributions of
1;2;f"1;tg
4
t=0 ; and "I, without additional assumptions.41
We combine both samples so that a person's contribution to likelihood is given by (20) if
an individual comes from sample A and is given by (21) if he comes from sample B. In this
case, we would be able to recover all of the elements of the model. To see why, notice that
from sample A alone the only unidentied parameters are the coecients and distributions
for earnings in t > 1. In sample B we can form the left hand sides of









2; t = f2;3;4g;
where all parameters except s;t;1 and s;t;2 for t = 2;3;4 are identied from data on sample
A: These covariances form a system of two linear equations in two unknowns that, under
a standard rank condition, we can solve for the unknowns s;t;1 and s;t;2 for t > 1 and
s = 0;1. A similar argument allows us to recover the parameters associated with 3 using
the covariances of the outcomes Ys;t after period 1. Since we have identied all of the
parameters of the earnings equations, we can solve for the structural parameters of the
choice equation and separate costs from future earnings. More generally, we can obtain
more ecient estimates for the overidentied parameters by pooling samples.
This procedure abstracts from cohort eects for the coecients and factor loadings, and
cohort eects for the distributions of . With additional structure (e.g., additivity), we can
41It is clear we will never recover any of the parameters of the measurement equations in this sample. If we
changed our normalizations on the rest of the system however, so that 2 does not enter the earnings equation
at t = 0;1 for example, and there was no third factor, we could recover all of the remaining parameters of
the model.
64identify such eects, but we acknowledge that general cohort eects can dramatically bias
estimates based on pooling the data.
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Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




Present value of earnings from age 19 to 28 discounted using an interest rate of 3%.  Let (Y
0,Y
1) denote
potential outcomes in high school and college sectors, respectively.  Let S=0 denote choice of the high 
school sector, and S=1 denote choice of the college sector.  Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1- S)Y   
0. 
Finally, let  f(y) denote the density function of observed earnings.  Here we plot the density functions f 
generated from the data (the dashed line), and that predicted by the model (the solid line). We use kernel












Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




Present value of earnings from age 29 to 38 discounted using an interest rate of 3%.  Let (Y
0,Y
1) denote
potential outcomes in high school and college sectors, respectively.  Let S=0 denote choice of the high 
school sector, and S=1 denote choice of the college sector.  Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1￿- S)Y   
0. 
Finally, let  f(y) denote the density function of observed earnings.  Here we plot the density functions f 
generated from the data (the dashed line), and that predicted by the model (the solid line). We use kernel













Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




Present value of earnings from age 39 to 48 discounted using an interest rate of 3%.  Let (Y
0,Y
1) denote
potential outcomes in high school and college sectors, respectively.  Let S=0 denote choice of the high 
school sector, and S=1 denote choice of the college sector.  Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1- S)Y   
0. 
Finally, let  f(y) denote the density function of observed earnings.  Here we plot the density functions f 
generated from the data (the dashed line), and that predicted by the model (the solid line). We use kernel















Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




Present value of earnings from age 49 to 58 discounted using an interest rate of 3%.  Let (Y
0,Y
1) denote
potential outcomes in high school and college sectors, respectively.  Let S=0 denote choice of the high 
school sector, and S=1 denote choice of the college sector.  Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1- S)Y   
0. 
Finally, let  f(y) denote the density function of observed earnings.  Here we plot the density functions f 
generated from the data (the dashed line), and that predicted by the model (the solid line). We use kernel













Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




Present value of earnings from age 59 to 65 discounted using an interest rate of 3%.  Let (Y
0,Y
1) denote
potential outcomes in high school and college sectors, respectively.  Let S=0 denote choice of the high 
school sector, and S=1 denote choice of the college sector.  Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1￿- S)Y   
0. 
Finally, let  f(y) denote the density function of observed earnings.  Here we plot the density functions f 
generated from the data (the dashed line), and that predicted by the model (the solid line). We use kernel
density estimation to smooth these functions.Present value of earnings from age 19 to 28 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Earnings here are Y
0.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
0| S=0) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.















Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 19 to 28 for people who choose to graduate high school
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 29 to 38 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Earnings here are Y
0.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
0| S=0) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.















Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 29 to 38 for people who choose to graduate high school
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 39 to 48 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Earnings here are Y
0.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
0| S=0) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.











Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 39 to 48 for people who choose to graduate high school
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 49 to 58 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Earnings here are Y
0.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
0| S=0) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.












Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 49 to 58 for people who choose to graduate high school
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 59 to 65 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. Earnings here are Y
0.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
0|S=0) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.









Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 59 to 65 for people who choose to graduate high school
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 19 to 28 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. This plot is for Y
1.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
1| S=1) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.















Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 19 to 28 for people who choose to graduate college
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 29 to 38 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. This plot is for Y
1.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
1| S=1) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.











Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 29 to 38 for people who choose to graduate college
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 39 to 48 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. This plot is for Y
1.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
1| S=1) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.












Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 39 to 48 for people who choose to graduate college
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 49 to 58 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. This plot is for Y
1.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
1| S=1) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.















Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings
from age 49 to 58 for people who choose to graduate college
Thousands of Dollars
Fitted
ActualPresent value of earnings from age 59 to 65 discounted using an interest rate of 3%. This plot is for Y
1.
Here we plot the density functions f(y
1| S=1) generated from the data (the dashed line), and that
predicted by the model (the solid line).  We use kernel density estimation to smooth these functions.













Densities of fitted and actual present value of earnings




1) denote the probability density function of factor θ
1.  We allow f(θ
1) to be a mixture




1).  Let φ(µ
1,σ
1) denote the density of a normal random variable
with mean µ
1 and variance σ
1.  The solid curve is the actual density of factor θ
1, f(θ
1), while the dashed
curve is the density of a normal random variable with mean µ
1 and variance σ
1.  We proceed similarly for
factors 2 and 3 using the notation in the legend.










Densities of estimated factors and their normal equivalents
Factor
Factor 1
Normal version of factor 1
Factor 2
Normal version of factor 2
Factor 3
Normal version of factor 3Let f(θ
1) denote the probability density function of factor θ
1.  We allow f(θ
1) to be a mixture
of normals.  The solid line plots the density of factor 1 conditional on choosing the high school sector,
that is, f(θ
1|choice=high school).  The dashed line plots the density of factor 1 conditional on choosing
the college sector, that is, f(θ
1|choice=college).

















2) denote the probability density function of factor θ
2.  We allow f(θ
2) to be a mixture
of normals.  The solid line plots the density of factor 2 conditional on choosing the high school sector,
that is, f(θ
2|choice=high school).  The dashed line plots the density of factor 2 conditional on choosing
the college sector, that is, f(θ
2|choice=college).
















3) denote the probability density function of factor θ
3.  We allow f(θ
3) to be a mixture
of normals.  The solid line plots the density of factor 3 conditional on choosing the high school sector,
that is, f(θ
3|choice=high school).  The dashed line plots the density of factor 3 conditional on choosing
the college sector, that is, f(θ
3|choice=college).














0 denote the present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the high school sector (discounted at a 3%
interest rate). Let f(Y
0) denote its density function.  The  solid  line  plots the predicted Y
0 density
conditional on choosing high school, that is, f(Y
0| S=0), while the dashed line shows the counterfactual
density function of Y
0 for those agents who are actually college graduates, that is, f(Y
0| S=1). This














Densities of ex post present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings




1 denote the present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the college sector (discounted at a 3%
interest rate).  Let f(Y
1) denote its density function.  The dashed line plots the predicted Y
1 density
conditional on choosing college, that is, f(Y
1|S=1), while the solid line shows the counterfactual
density function of Y
1 for those agents who are actually high school graduates, that is, f(Y
1|S=0). This
















Densities of ex post present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings
from age 19 to 65 in the college sector
Thousands of Dollars
HS (counterfactual)













Densities of ex ante present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings







1,t, t=0,...T).  Let E (Y
0) denote the ex ante present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the
high school sector (discounted at a 3% interest rate).  Let f(E
curve plots the predicted Y
0 density conditional on choosing high school, that is, f(E (Y
0)|S=0), while the
dashed line shows the counterfactual density function of E (Y
0) for those agents who are actually college
graduates, that is, f(E (Y
0)|S=1).  This is constructed assuming that the agent chooses schooling without 
knowing 
                                                 
and e.
￿
q  ,e 3
q  ,e 3
q  ,e 3
q
  3
q  ,e 3
(Y
0 q  ,e 3











Densities of ex ante present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings




Let e={e    ,e    ,t=0,...,T}  . Let E      (Y ) denote the ex ante present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the
0,t 1,t q  ,e
3
1
college sector (discounted at a 3% interest rate). Let f(E      (Y )) denote its density function. The solid line q  ,e
3
1
plots the counterfactual Y   density conditional on choosing high school, that is, f(E      (Y )| S=0), while the  1 1 q  ,e
3
dashed line shows the predicted density function of E      (Y ) for those agents who are actually college graduates,
that is,  f(E      (Y )| S=0). This is constructed assuming that the agent chooses schooling without knowing q  and e.
q  ,e
3
q  ,e 3
1
1 3Let Y
0 denote the present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the high school sector (discounted at a 3%
interest rate).  Let f(Y
0) denote its density function.  The solid curve plots the predicted Y
0 density
conditional on choosing high school, that is, f(Y
0|S=0), while the dashed line shows the counterfactual
density function of Y
0 for those agents who are actually college graduates, that is, f(Y
0|S=1).  This
assumes that the agent chooses schooling with complete knowledge of future earnings.








Densities of present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings from age 19 to 65




1 denote the present value of earnings from age 19 to 65 in the college sector (discounted at a 3%
interest rate).  Let f(Y
1) denote its density function.  The solid curve plots the counterfactual Y
1 density
conditional on choosing high school, that is, f(Y
1|S=0), while the dashed line shows the predicted
density function of Y
1 for those agents who are actually college graduates, that is, f(Y
1|S=1).  This
assumes that the agent chooses schooling with complete knowledge of future earnings.










Densities of present value of counterfactual and fitted earnings from age 19 to 65





1 denote the present value of earnings in the high school and college sectors, respectively.
Define ex post returns to college as the ratio R=(Y
1−Y
0)/Y
0.  Let f(r) denote the density function of
the random variable R.  The solid line is the density of ex post returns to college for high school
graduates, that is f(r|S=0).  The dashed line is the density of ex post returns to college for college


















Densities of ex post returns to college by level of schooling chosen




1,t, t=0,...T).  Let Y
0,Y
1 denote the present value of earnings in the high school and college









0).  Let f(r)
denote the density function of the random variable E
θ
3
,ε(R).  The solid line is the density of ex post returns
to college for high school graduates, that is f(r|S=0).  The dashed line is the density of ex post returns to
college for college graduates, that is, f(r|S=1).   This assumes that the agent chooses schooling without
knowing θ
3 and ε.










Densities of ex ante returns to college by level of schooling chosen




1 denote the present value of earnings in the high school and college sectors, respectively
(discounted at a 3% interest rate).  Define returns to college as the ratio R=(Y
1−Y
0)/Y
0.  Let f(r)
denote the density function of the random variable R.  The solid line is the density of returns to college
for high school graduates, that is f(r|S=0).  The dashed line is the density of returns to college for college
graduates, that is, f(r|S=1).  This assumes that the agent chooses schooling with complete knowledge of
future earnings.










Densities of returns to college by schooling level chosen assuming perfect certainty
Fraction of the Base State
High School
CollegeLet C denote the monetary value of psychic costs.  Let f(c) denote the density function of psychic costs
in monetary terms.  The dashed line shows the density of psychic costs for high school graduates, that
is f(c|S=0).  The dotted line shows the density of psychic costs for college graduates, that is, f(c|S=1).
The solid line is the unconditional density of the monetary value of psychic costs, f(c).









Densities of monetary value of psychic cost





Let Θ denote the agent’s information set.  Let Y
0 denote the present value of earnings in the high school
sector (discounted at a 3% interest rate).  Let f(y
0|Θ) denote the density of the present value of earnings
in high school conditioned on the information set Θ. Then:
The solid line plots f(y
0|Θ) under no information, i.e. Θ=∅.
The dashed line plots f(y
0|Θ) when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1).
The dashed-dotted line plots f(y
0|Θ) when factors 1 and 2 are in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1,θ
2).
The crossed line plots f(y




The X are put at the mean and are assumed to be known. The θ, when known, are set at their mean of zero.












Densities of present value of high school earnings
under different information sets for the agent calculated












Let Θ denote the agent’s information set.  Let Y
1 denote the present value of earnings in the college
sector (discounted at a 3% interest rate).  Let f(y
1|Θ) denote the density of the present value of earnings
in high school conditioned on the information set Θ. Then:
The solid line plots f(y
1|Θ) under no information, i.e. Θ=∅.
The dashed line plots f(y
1|Θ) when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1).
The dashed-dotted line plots f(y
1|Θ) when factors 1 and 2 are in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1,θ
2).
The crossed line plots f(y




The X are put at the mean and are assumed to be known. The θ, when known, are set at their mean of zero.










Densities of present value of college earnings
under different information sets for the agent calculated













Let Θ denote the agent’s information set.  Let Y
0,Y
1 denote the present value of earnings in the high school
and college sectors, respectively (discounted at a 3% interest rate).  Let D=Y
0-Y
1 be the difference of the present
value of earnings in the college and high school sector.  f(d|Θ) denote the density of the difference of present
value of earnings conditioned on the information set Θ. Then:
The solid line plots f(d|Θ) under no information, i.e. Θ=∅.
The dashed line plots f(d|Θ) when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1).
The dashed-dotted line plots f(d|Θ) when factors 1 and 2 are in the information set, i.e. Θ=(θ
1,θ
2).




The X are put at the mean and are assumed to be known The θ when known are set at their mean of zero









Densities of returns college vs high school
under different information sets for the agent calculated











3)Variable Coefficient Std. Error




Variable Coefficient Std. Error
bSchool + bSchool*ASVAB*ASVAB 12.6244 0.7284
Marginal Effect 4.8333 0.2654
bSchool + bSchool*ASVAB*ASVAB 22.9150 1.3221
Marginal Effect 8.7731 0.4817
*Includes controls for Mincer experience (age - years of schooling - 6), experience squared, cohort dummies, and 
ASVAB scores.
†We use parental education, family income, broken home, number of siblings, distance to college, local tuition, 
cohort dummies, South at age 14 and urban at age 14 to instrument for schooling and schooling interacted with 
ASVAB scores.
‡We use the predicted return to school to test whether future earnings affect current schooling choices. We include 
controls for family background, cohort dummies, distance to college, and local tuition.
Instrumental Variables†




Estimated Effects of Ex Post Returns to Schooling on Schooling 
Choice using OLS and IV To Estimate The Ex Post Returns To 
Schooling
Log Earnings Regression*
OLSVariable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Asvab AR* 1362 0.72 0.95 -1.78 1.96 747 0.26 0.89 -1.78 1.96 615 1.27 0.70 -1.36 1.96
Asvab PC* 1362 0.42 0.80 -2.68 1.36 747 0.07 0.86 -2.68 1.36 615 0.84 0.44 -1.06 1.36
Asvab WK* 1362 0.52 0.72 -2.29 1.34 747 0.20 0.76 -2.29 1.34 615 0.92 0.41 -1.36 1.34
Asvab MK* 1362 0.62 1.03 -1.62 2.11 747 0.00 0.81 -1.62 2.11 615 1.38 0.73 -1.46 2.11
Asvab CS* 1362 0.21 0.85 -2.52 2.49 747 -0.08 0.79 -2.52 2.08 615 0.56 0.77 -2.52 2.49
Urban at age 14 3695 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 1953 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00 1742 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
Parents Divorced 3695 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 1953 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1742 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Number of Siblings 3695 2.86 1.96 0.00 17.00 1953 3.19 2.08 0.00 14.00 1742 2.49 1.74 0.00 17.00
Father's Education 3695 4.31 1.94 1.00 8.00 1953 3.56 1.51 1.00 8.00 1742 5.15 2.03 1.00 8.00
Mother's Education 3695 4.21 1.55 1.00 8.00 1953 3.68 1.26 1.00 8.00 1742 4.79 1.63 1.00 8.00
Born between 1906 and 1915 3695 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 1953 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 1742 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Born between 1916 and 1925 3695 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 1953 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 1742 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Born between 1926 and 1935 3695 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 1953 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 1742 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Born between 1936 and 1945 3695 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 1953 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 1742 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Born between 1946 and 1955 3695 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 1953 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 1742 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Born between 1956 and 1965 3695 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1953 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1742 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Born between 1966 and 1975 3695 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 1953 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 1742 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Education 3695 1.47 0.50 1.00 2.00 1953 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1742 2.00 0.00 2.00 2.00
Age in 1980 3695 26.87 12.32 5.00 68.00 1953 26.53 13.10 5.00 68.00 1742 27.25 11.39 9.00 68.00
Grade Completed 1980 1362 12.06 1.66 8.00 18.00 747 11.44 0.92 8.00 12.00 615 12.80 2.03 9.00 18.00
Enrolled in 1980 1362 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 747 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 615 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00
PV of Earnings† 7152 2.38 1.64 0.00 18.59 3708 1.95 1.14 0.00 11.52 3444 2.83 1.95 0.00 18.59
Tuition at age 17 3695 1.80 0.72 0.00 5.55 1953 1.82 0.74 0.00 5.55 1742 1.76 0.70 0.00 5.55
*Note:
  AR=Arithmetic Reasoning
  PC=Paragraph Composition
  WK= Word Knowledge
  MK=Math Knowledge
  CS=Coding Speed
†In thousands of Dollars
Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics from the Pooled NLSY/1979 and PSID (white males)
Full Sample High School Sample College SampleVariable Name Cost Function (Z) Test System (X M) Earnings (X)
Urban at age 14 Yes Yes No
Parents Divorced Yes Yes No
Number of Siblings Yes Yes No
Father's Education Yes Yes No
Mother's Education Yes Yes No
Born between 1906 and 1915 Yes No Yes
Born between 1916 and 1925 Yes No Yes
Born between 1926 and 1935 Yes No Yes
Born between 1936 and 1945 Yes No Yes
Born between 1946 and 1955 Yes No Yes
Born between 1956 and 1965 Yes No Yes
Born between 1966 and 1975 Yes No Yes
Age in 1980 No Yes No
Grade Completed 1980 No Yes No
Enrolled in 1980 No Yes No
Tuition at age 17 Yes No No
List of Variables Included and Excluded in Each System
Table 2.2Coefficients Mean Standard Deviation
Constant -2.2504 0.3587
Mother’s Education 0.2250 0.0274
Father’s Education 0.3386 0.0246
Parents Divorced -0.1976 0.0845
Number of Siblings -0.1012 0.0163
Urban Residence at age 14 0.1998 0.0755
Dummy birth 1916-1925 0.6076 0.3582
Dummy birth 1926-1935 0.5553 0.3471
Dummy birth 1936-1945 0.7050 0.3417
Dummy birth 1946-1955 0.4160 0.3355
Dummy birth 1956-1965 -0.2064 0.3346
Dummy birth 1966-1975 -1.4159 0.3703
Tuition at 4-year college -0.0953 0.0447
Loading Factor 1 1.3523 0.1315
Loading Factor 2 0.4785 0.1335
Loading Factor 3 -0.0624 0.1274
Estimated Coefficients in Schooling Choice Equation
Table 2.3Coefficients Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dummy birth 1916-1925 - - - - - - - - -0.1054 0.0829
Dummy birth 1926-1935 - - - - - - -0.0225 0.0974 -0.1443 0.0809
Dummy birth 1936-1945 - - - - -0.1105 0.1034 -0.0201 0.0989 0.0616 0.1276
Dummy birth 1946-1955 - - -0.1779 0.0987 -0.2636 0.0917 0.1657 0.1973 - -
Dummy birth 1956-1965 -0.7107 0.0637 -0.2936 0.0883 -0.0757 0.1385 ----
Dummy birth 1966-1975 -0.6730 0.0960 -0.2360 0.2267 - - ----
Constant 2.6276 0.0658 2.4021 0.0935 1.8880 0.0870 1.2819 0.0870 0.6147 0.0746
Loading Factor 1 0.1636 0.0433 0.1059 0.0485 0.0164 0.0949 0.0466 0.1122 -0.0077 0.0775
Loading Factor 2 -1.2138 0.0903 -1.6282 0.1142 -1.4415 0.1172 -1.1225 0.1056 -0.3924 0.0763
Loading Factor 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2428 0.1684 0.2791 0.1510 0.1327 0.1013
Coefficients Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dummy birth 1916-1925 - - - - - - - - -0.2976 0.3218
Dummy birth 1926-1935 - - - - - - -0.0881 0.1846 -0.3743 0.3147
Dummy birth 1936-1945 - - - - -0.0059 0.1710 0.0384 0.1696 -0.2256 0.3457
Dummy birth 1946-1955 - - -0.1944 0.1262 -0.0512 0.1568 0.2122 0.2238 - -
Dummy birth 1956-1965 -0.7375 0.0686 -0.2340 0.1182 -0.1081 0.2910 ----
Dummy birth 1966-1975 -0.3459 0.1736 1.3144 0.7365 - - ----
Constant 2.2802 0.0670 3.5270 0.1191 3.1859 0.1720 2.4843 0.1914 1.3632 0.3367
Loading Factor 1 0.2225 0.0853 0.3137 0.1296 -0.2870 0.2415 -0.2676 0.2656 -0.0144 0.2300
Loading Factor 2 1.0000 0.0000 2.3887 0.1573 2.3194 0.1715 1.7102 0.1806 0.7481 0.1231
Loading Factor 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.5354 0.1627 0.8876 0.1665
Period Three Period 4
Table 2.4
Estimated Coefficients for High School Earnings Equation
Period Zero Period One Period Two
Estimated Coefficients for College Earnings Equation
Period Zero Period One Period Two Period Three Period 4Coefficients Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Constant -1.1198 0.2256 -1.0262 0.1719 -0.5180 0.2032 -1.4751 0.2265 -1.2706 0.2281
Mother’s Education 0.0735 0.0177 0.0529 0.0136 0.0614 0.0158 0.0469 0.0178 0.0561 0.0175
Father’s Education 0.0494 0.0136 0.0593 0.0105 0.0461 0.0121 0.0168 0.0139 0.0870 0.0135
Family Income in 1979 0.0008 0.0015 0.0009 0.0012 0.0000 0.0014 0.0038 0.0016 0.0021 0.0015
Parents Divorced -0.0584 0.0564 -0.0514 0.0440 -0.0947 0.0508 0.0458 0.0569 -0.0138 0.0560
Number of Siblings -0.0193 0.0111 -0.0397 0.0086 -0.0143 0.0099 -0.0273 0.0115 -0.0313 0.0110
South Residence at age 14 -0.1278 0.0463 -0.0906 0.0358 -0.0064 0.0423 -0.1418 0.0475 -0.1365 0.0464
Urban Residence at age 14 0.0640 0.0461 -0.0243 0.0361 0.0117 0.0422 0.0258 0.0468 0.0529 0.0466
Enrolled at School at Test Date 0.0646 0.0528 -0.0036 0.0403 -0.0515 0.0471 0.0074 0.0527 0.3122 0.0529
Age at Test Date 0.0096 0.0164 0.0237 0.0128 -0.0170 0.0148 0.0048 0.0165 -0.0510 0.0166
Highest Grade Completed at Test Date 0.0911 0.0198 0.0604 0.0155 0.0721 0.0179 0.1082 0.0201 0.1732 0.0198
Loading Factor 1 1.0000 0.0000 0.6801 0.0321 0.8069 0.0377 0.5648 0.0319 0.9562 0.0293
Loading Factor 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Loading Factor 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coding Speed
Table 2.5
Estimated Coefficients of Test Equations
Math Knowledge Word Knowledge
Paragraph 
Composition Arithmetic ReasoningHigh School College Overall
 χ
2 Statistic 91.9681 74.2503 204.3823
Critical Value* 107.5217 82.5287 178.4854
 χ
2 Statistic 86.6649 107.6417 207.6152
Critical Value* 116.5110 116.5110 218.8205
 χ
2 Statistic 26.2658 45.5301 106.5721
Critical Value* 43.7730 55.7585 91.6702
 χ
2 Statistic 35.3846 29.7218 55.5758
Critical Value* 31.4104 30.1435 55.7585
 χ
2 Statistic 23.2193 14.9131 41.8657
Critical Value* 23.6848 16.9190 35.1725








Goodness of Fit Tests: Predicted Earnings Densities vs. Actual DensitiesHigh School College Overall
 χ
2 Statistic 109.5702 132.3027 267.4894
Critical Value* 107.5217 82.5287 178.4854
 χ
2 Statistic 104.1649 150.5556 247.6732
Critical Value* 116.5110 116.5110 218.8205
 χ
2 Statistic 40.7028 61.7322 114.1692
Critical Value* 43.7730 55.7585 91.6702
 χ
2 Statistic 39.7253 47.5559 64.2503
Critical Value* 31.4104 30.1435 55.7585
 χ
2 Statistic 18.3217 26.5855 40.4078
Critical Value* 23.6848 16.9190 35.1725
* 95% Confidence, equiprobable bins with approx. 15 people per bin
Period 5
Table 3b





The Two-Factor ModelTable 4.1
High School 1 2 3456789 1 0
1 0.0035 0.0109 0.0240 0.0326 0.0524 0.7538 0.1137 0.1557 0.2511 0.2808
2 0.0098 0.0244 0.0419 0.0631 0.0894 0.1122 0.1391 0.1747 0.2048 0.1407
3 0.0160 0.0466 0.0741 0.0877 0.1041 0.1213 0.1441 0.1549 0.1581 0.0931
4 0.0236 0.0603 0.0911 0.1062 0.1220 0.1298 0.1348 0.1372 0.1266 0.0683
5 0.0439 0.0848 0.1108 0.1227 0.1303 0.1309 0.1211 0.1139 0.0928 0.0489
6 0.0627 0.1074 0.1214 0.1304 0.1330 0.1218 0.1168 0.0954 0.0695 0.0415
7 0.0963 0.1256 0.1340 0.1334 0.1200 0.1200 0.0937 0.0784 0.0554 0.0433
8 0.1378 0.1659 0.1529 0.1396 0.1114 0.0925 0.0740 0.0561 0.0296 0.0402
9 0.1939 0.1970 0.1498 0.1180 0.1002 0.0771 0.0534 0.0362 0.0200 0.0543
10 0.3354 0.1983 0.1167 0.0812 0.0515 0.0351 0.0266 0.0152 0.0130 0.1271
Ex-Post Conditional Distributions (College Earnings Conditional on High School Earnings)
Pr(di<Yc≤di+1 |dj<Yh≤dj+1) where di is the ith decile of the College Lifetime Ex-Post Earnings Distribution and d j is the jth 
decile of the High School Ex-Post Lifetime Earnings Distribution
Corrrelation(YC,YH) = -0.3899
CollegeTable 4.2
High School 123456789 1 0
1 0.0002 0.0079 0.0108 0.0226 0.0421 0.0594 0.0909 0.1447 0.2236 0.3978
2 0.0044 0.0180 0.0286 0.0530 0.0720 0.1010 0.1362 0.1686 0.2114 0.2068
3 0.0106 0.0362 0.0578 0.0786 0.1062 0.1152 0.1498 0.1618 0.1692 0.1146
4 0.0200 0.0546 0.0786 0.1024 0.1204 0.1266 0.1376 0.1406 0.1290 0.0902
5 0.0390 0.0740 0.1004 0.1130 0.1291 0.1387 0.1295 0.1206 0.1010 0.0546
6 0.0454 0.1017 0.1253 0.1353 0.1333 0.1323 0.1189 0.1011 0.0754 0.0314
7 0.0873 0.1299 0.1437 0.1451 0.1299 0.1199 0.0965 0.0777 0.0519 0.0180
8 0.1336 0.1603 0.1613 0.1431 0.1160 0.0974 0.0793 0.0589 0.0389 0.0112
9 0.2063 0.2016 0.1651 0.1293 0.1056 0.0840 0.0540 0.0317 0.0155 0.0068
10 0.4123 0.2318 0.1393 0.0868 0.0556 0.0365 0.0210 0.0110 0.0049 0.0006
College
Ex-Ante Conditional Distribution (College Earnings Conditional on High School Earnings)
Pr(di<Yc≤di+1 |dj<Yh≤dj+1) where di is the ith decile of the College Lifetime Ex-Ante Earnings Distribution and dj is the jth decile 
of the High School Ex-Ante Lifetime Earnings Distribution
Individual expects out θ3 and εs,t for t=0, … , 4, which are unknown by the agent at the time of the schooling choice.
Corrrelation(YC,YH) =  -0.6993High School (Fitted)
College 
(counterfactual)
Average Present Value of Earnings  605.92 969.34




§ to college for high school graduates
*Thousands of dollars. Discounted using a 3% interest rate.
†The counterfactual is constructed using the estimated college outcome equation applied to the population 
of persons selecting high school




Average present value of earnings
* for high school graduates
Fitted and Counterfactual
†
White males from NLSY79High School 
(Counterfactual)
College (fitted)
Average Present Value of Earnings  536.43 1007.64




§  to college for college graduates
* Thousands of dollars. Discounted using a 3% interest rate.
†The counterfactual is constructed using the estimated high school outcome equation applied to the 
population of persons selecting college




Average present value of earnings
* for college graduates
Fitted and Counterfactual
†
White males from NLSY79High School College
Average  Present Value of Earnings 571.33 975.16
Std. Err. 37.066 70.557
Average returns 
Std. Err.
† As a fraction of the base state, i.e. (PVearnings(Col)-PVearnings(HS))/PVearnings(HS).
Average returns
† to college for people indifferent between high school and college
§ Thousands of dollars. Discounted using a 3% interest rate.




Average present value of earnings
* for population of persons 
indifferent between high school and college
Conditional on education level
White males from NLSY79Table 5.4
Average ex-post, ex-ante and perfect certainty returns∗
White males from NLSY79
For people who choose high school
ex-post† ex-ante‡ perfect certainty§
Average 1.1594 1.1594 0.9337
Std. Err. 0.1362 0.1362 0.1154
For people who choose college
ex-post† ex-ante‡ perfect certainty§
Average 1.3398 1.3398 1.6121
Std. Err. 0.1083 0.1083 0.1082
For people indiﬀerent between high school and college
ex-post† ex-ante‡ perfect certainty§
Average 1.2585 1.2585 1.2418
Std. Err. 0.3868 0.3868 0.1067
∗ Let Y0,Y1 denote the present value of earnings in high school and






† Let I denote the schooling choice index. Let Θ0 denote the informa-
tion set of the agent at the time of the schooling choice. Let R denote
the return to college. The ex-post mean return to college for a high-
school graduate is E (R | E0 (I) < 0), where E0 (I) = E (I | Θ0).
Similarly, the ex-post mean return to college for a college graduate is
E (R | E0 (I) ≥ 0). The ex-post mean return to an agent just indiﬀer-
ent between college and high-school is E (R | E0 (I) = 0).
‡ Let I denote the schooling index. Let Θ0 denote the information
set of the agent at the time of the schooling choice. Let R denote the
return to college. The ex-ante mean return to college for a high-school
graduate is E (E0 (R) | E0 (I) < 0). Similarly, the ex-ante mean return
to college for a college graduate is E (E0 (R) | E0 (I) ≥ 0). The ex-ante
mean return to an agent just indiﬀerent between college and high-school
is E (E0 (R) | E0 (I) = 0). By a property of means, the mean ex-ante
and the mean ex-post returns must be equal for the same conditioning
set, i.e. E (E0 (R) | E0 (I) ≥ 0) = E (R | E0 (I) ≥ 0).
§ Let I denote the schooling index. Let R denote the return to col-
lege. The return to college under perfect certainty for a high-school
graduate is E (R | I < 0). Note that now the agent makes his schooling
choice under perfect certainty (that is why we condition on I). Simi-
larly, the return to college under perfect certainty for a college graduate
is E (R | I ≥ 0). The return to college under perfect certainty for an
agent just indiﬀerent between college and high-school is E (R | I = 0).Table 6.1
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Present Value of Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 156402.14 73827.89 267796.38
Θ = {θ1} 0.95% 0.27% 0.44%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 29.10% 29.43% 47.42%
Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3} 68.03% 32.27% 62.65%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†The variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings
Θ = {θ1} is (1-0.0095)*156402.14
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 19 and 65
as predicted at age 19.
1Table 6.2
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Period Zero Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 13086.24 14303.35 33910.17
Θ = {θ1} 1.90% 0.91% 0.05%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 23.58% 30.08% 41.02%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†The variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings
Θ = {θ1} is (1-0.0190)*13086.24
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 19 and 28
as predicted at age 19.
2Table 6.3
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Period One Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 26618.64 17545.90 65804.89
Θ = {θ1} 1.90% 0.31% 0.34%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 62.43% 43.00% 69.60%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†So we would say that the variance of the unpredictable component of period 1
college earnings × = {θ1} is (1-0.0190)*26618.64
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 29 and 38
as predicted at age 19.
3Table 6.4
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Period Two Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 40406.20 16716.50 68918.36
Θ = {θ1} 0.95% 0.00% 0.63%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 38.66% 35.02% 58.63%
Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3} 75.25% 40.17% 70.98%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†The variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings
Θ = {θ1} is (1-0.0095)*40406.20
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 39 and 48
as predicted at age 19.
4Table 6.5
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Period Three Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 53194.23 14605.29 66926.12
Θ = {θ1} 0.65% 0.08% 0.73%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 16.18% 24.55% 34.65%
Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3} 81.20% 31.53% 70.11%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†The variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings
Θ = {θ1} is (1-0.0065)*53194.23
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 49 and 58
as predicted at age 19.
5Table 6.6
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Period Four of Earnings∗
Under Diﬀerent Information Sets
(fraction of the variance explained by Θ)†
The Calculation is for the Entire Population Regardless of Schooling Choice.
Var(Yc) Var (Yh) Var(Yc-Yh)
For lifetime:‡
Variance when Θ = ∅ 23096.81 10656.83 32236.82
Θ = {θ1} 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Θ = {θ1,θ2} 6.84% 4.10% 11.41%
Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3} 56.70% 6.16% 37.95%
∗We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings.
†The variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings
Θ = {θ1} is (1-0.00)*23096.81
‡Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 59 and 65
as predicted at age 19.
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